India and the Battle for Tamil Eelam
(Sri Lanka)

Thanjai Nalankilli

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edited by

Thanjai Nalankilli

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AUTHORS

Siva Reddy (4)
Thanjai Nalankilli (18)
Yashoda Reddy (4)

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Preface

(common to all 5 books)

There are 5 books from us on the "Battle for Tamil Eelam". Together they provide an overall perspective on the ongoing conflict between the Tamil minority and Sinhala majority in Sri Lanka.

Articles in these 5 books were originally published between 1997 and 2019, at various points in the history of the Sinhala-Tamil ethnic conflict/war. Date of original publication is provided below the author name in each article. Our articles provide snapshots of the situation in Sri Lanka between 1997 and 2019, and useful to anyone who wants to understand what happened in Sri Lanka in those fateful years.

We think that the conflict will continue in one form or another, for a separate country or for equal treatment within a federal country, until the minority Tamils feel they are not treated as second class citizens, not economically exploited and their language and culture are respected and protected.

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1.
Reason for India's Anti-Tamil Policies and Actions in the Sri Lankan Ethnic Conflict

Thanjai Nalankilli

[First Published: May 2018]

OUTLINE

1. Introduction
2. Flawed Reasons Debunked
3. Real Reason
4. Background
5. Multi-Ethnic India
6. Who Rules India?
7. Concluding Remarks

1. Introduction

India's policies and actions in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict/war between the majority Sinhalese who control the government and the minority Tamils have been consistently anti-Tamil from the very beginning to the present (2018). It is puzzling to many international and even Indian analysts why Indian government is hostile to Tamil aspirations for their legitimate rights in Sri Lanka, especially in view of the fact that India has a Tamil population of approximately 60 million in Tamil Nadu State.

2. Flawed Reasons Debunked

Reasons given are as follows:

1) Once Tamil Eelam is independent, it will set out to liberate Tamil Nadu from India.

2) Once Tamil Eelam is independent, it will destabilize Tamil Nadu.

3) Once Tamil Eelam is independent, it would want to merge Tamil Nadu with it and create "Greater Tamil Eelam".

4) An independent Tamil Eelam would inspire the various minority nationalities in India to aspire for independence and India would breakup like the Soviet Union.

5) An independent Tamil Eelam is not in the national interest of India.

We have discussed these reasons in some depth and found them flawed [References 1, and Chapters 3-4 in this book].

3. Real Reason

If an independent Tamil Eelam is in the national and defense interests of India [Chapter 3], why is not India helping Sri Lankan Tamils get an independent country (as it did "Pakistani Bengalis" get an independent country Bangladesh)? India is not only not helping Tamils but it helps Sri Lankan government financially, militarily and diplomatically to make sure Tamils do not get an independent country. Why?

Tamil Eelam is not against the interest of India but India's rulers (Hindi politicians) think it is against their (Hindis') self-interest. To understand it and India's anti-Tamil Sri Lankan policy, one need to know some basic, seldom discussed, information about India.

4. Background

India's policies and actions in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict/war between the majority Sinhalese who control the government and the minority Tamils have been consistently anti-Tamil from the very beginning to the present (2018). It is puzzling to many international and even Indian analysts why Indian government is hostile to Tamil aspirations for their legitimate rights in Sri Lanka, especially in view of the fact that India has a Tamil population of approximately 60 million in Tamil Nadu State. Tamils of India and Tamils of Sri Lanka are blood brothers and sisters; they are ethnically/racially the same and speak the same language. Tamils of Tamil Nadu have supported their blood brothers and sisters during the entire Sinhala-Tamil ethnic conflict/war in Sri Lanka. Unfortunately they could do very little to help them except to raise their voices against the injustice and then beg and plead to the Indian government to help Sri Lankan Tamils [Reference 2]. Indian government playbook is to say a few soothing words and making promises to people of Tamil Nadu but continue with its anti-Tamil policies. What is the reason?

5. Multi-Ethnic India

One should understand that India is not a single-nation country but a multi-national entity with dozens of languages, cultures and heritages with each group living in one or more states for thousands of years. There is no blood bond between the North and South, let alone differences within South and within North. There is no cultural unity between North and South. So, as the Sinhala-Tamil war continued in Sri Lanka, there is very little empathy in the north among the people or politicians except for a few human rights groups and individuals.

6. Who Rules India?

Who decides India's military and foreign policies? India is ruled by Hindi-belt politicians of North India; ministers from outside the Hindi belt have no influence if their views contradict Hindi politicians'. This is discussed in detail in Reference 3. Hindi people, politicians and the "elites" consider themselves the descendents of Aryans and South Indians consider themselves Dravidians. Where this racial theory is true or not is

immaterial as long as North and South Indians think so. It is within this context that you should analyze Indian government's anti-Tamil policies.

Tamil Nadu irks India's Hindu rulers by being at the forefront on the demand for devolution of power to states (thus reducing Hindi politicians' power over non-Hindi states) and opposing vehemently Hindi imposition and thus delaying Hindi politicians' cherished goal of making their mother tongue Hindi the business and governance language of all of India.

Not only Hindi and Tamil cultures and languages different, there are ancient rivalries and, even enmities that have come to fore in post-British India. Tamil is a living testimony contradicting Hindi elites' and Indian government's false claim that Sanskrit is the mother of all Indian languages. This irks Hindi elite and politicians and Indian government makes every effort to downplay and downgrade Tamil in the international arena [see Reference 4]. There is serious concern among some Tamil scholars that Tamil would become an useless language in India as Indian government is removing Tamil wherever it can in Tamil Nadu itself. There is a saying. "a language without an army is a dialect". An independent Tamil Eelam would be a safe haven for Tamil. Hindi politicians do not like that. For example, whatever happens to Bengali language in India, it would survive as a living language and accepted in the international arena because Bengalis have their country Bangladesh.

7. Concluding Remarks

To put it succinctly, independent Tamil Eelam is actually in the national interest of India [Chapter 3] but it not in the interest of India's rulers (the Hindis), as the Hindi elite see it. That is the reason for Indian government's anti-Tamil actions in Sri Lanka. It has nothing to do with country's national interest.

No one can rule India without the support of the Hindi-centric parties, currently Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Congress. These parties may differ on many issues but they have the same anti-Tamil policy on the Srilankan ethnic conflict.

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2.
Professor Boyle: India is Guilty of "Complicity" in Sri Lankan Tamil Genocide

Thanjai Nalankilli

[First Published: August 2009]

OUTLINE

Abbreviations
1. Professor Boyle's Statement on Sri Lanka
2. Tamil Civilian Sufferings During and After the War
3. Is India an Evil Stepmother to Sri Lankan Tamils?

Abbreviations

GOSL - Government of Sri Lanka
IDP - Internally Displaced People
IMF - International Monetary Fund
LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
UK - United Kingdom
UN - United Nations
UNHRC - UN Human Rights Council
UNSC - UN Security Council
USA - United States of America

1. Professor Boyle's Statement on Sri Lanka

Dr. Francis A. Boyle is Professor of International Law at the Illinois University College of Law in United States of America (USA). Professor Boyle is an expert on international law and in 1993 he was responsible for winning two World Court orders against Yugoslavia on the basis of the 1948 Genocide Convention; these orders relate to Yugoslavian actions during Bosnian war.

Professor Boyle issued a statement on May 12, 2009 outlining the legal framework for a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting to end the war in Sri Lanka between the army and minority Tamil fighters (LTTE). He was highly critical of the governments India, USA, United Kingdom (UK) and France, for their inaction to call for an emergency UN Security Council meeting. **Here are excerpts pertaining to India**:

"India has an obligation to bring this matter to the attention of the Security Council under U.N. Charter Article 35 and to demand an immediate, emergency meeting of the Security Council under its Rule of Procedure No. 3 in order to terminate the GOSL's genocide against the Tamils in Vanni. Failure by the Government of India to do so would only

render **India guilty of "complicity" in the GOSL's genocide** against the Tamils under Article III(e) of the 1948 Genocide Convention.

"Shall India--the Home of Gandhi--turn and look away from the Tamils in Sri Lanka as they are being exterminated by the GOSL without doing all in its power at both the Security Council and the International Court of Justice (as previously explained by this author) to save these Tamils for whom it serves as parens patriae under international law? Today the Tamils in Sri Lanka have now become Gandhi's Harijans. Yet so far the Government of India has treated the Tamils of Sri Lanka as if they were "untouchables." [Harijan - someone belonging to India's, so called, "lowest caste", also called untouchables; they were treated badly in India for a long time until very recently. Parens patriae is Latin for "parent of the nation".]

2. Tamil Civilian Sufferings During and After the War

India did not ask for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council as Professor Boyle suggested, and the war ended on May 17, 2009. Taking stock of the final phase of the war, UN concluded that 7,000 civilians were killed and 16,700 wounded between January 20 and May 7, 2009. More died between May 7 and May 17. The British newspaper Times said that one thousand civilians were killed each day during the final phase of the war. It based this conclusion on aerial photographs, official documents, witness accounts and expert testimony.

After the war ended, some 300,000 Tamils from the war zone were put against their wish in barbed wire relief camps (internally displaced people's camps (IDP camps)). Some western reporters compared them to Nazi concentration camps. Journalists and international observers were barred from the camps, except during a few government-organized tours. Very limited access was given to relief agencies, although appalling sanitary conditions and shortage of food and medical help were reported. The Times (UK) reported 1400 deaths a week in these camps.

3. Is India an Evil Stepmother to Sri Lankan Tamils?

Professor Boyle called India the "parens patriae". Does India consider itself the parent of Sri Lankan Tamils because of the 60 million Tamil population in its southern most state of Tamil Nadu?

Not only did India not ask for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council to end the war and and thus save Tamil civilian lives, it led an effort in late May (May 26 and 27, 2009) to block a resolution in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The resolution asked the Sri Lankan Government to give unfettered access to humanitarian agencies to IDP camps in which some 300,000 Tamil civilians were kept involuntarily after the war. Not only did India vote against the resolution but lead the effort, along with Brazil, Cuba and Pakistan to defeat the resolution. Thus Tamil civilians were denied relief from international agencies willing and able to help them. As we mentioned in the previous section, The Times newspaper (UK) reported 1400 deaths a

week in these camps. Many lives could have been saved if relief agencies were given unfettered access. Is this the action of a parent?

India again came to help Sri Lanka in July 2009. America and Britain opposed International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan to Sri Lanka in order to pressure Sri Lanka to allow more access to international humanitarian agencies to IDP camps. According to news reports, India supported Sri Lanka strongly and America withdrew its objection to the loan in view of India's position. The Sri Lankan newspaper Daily Mirror reported that India asked the visiting American Secretary of State Ms. Hillary Rodham Clinton to support the IMF loan to Sri Lanka. Again India had come up against Tamil civilians getting adequate relief in IDP camps. Is this the action of a parent?

In spite of the sixty million Tamil population in India's southernmost state of Tamil Nadu, **India is neither a father nor a mother to Sri Lankan Tamils**. It is not even a good stepmother. It is an evil stepmother helping the majority Sinhalese oppress and suppress the minority Tamils. God help the Tamils of Sri Lanka.

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3.
An Independent Tamil Eelam is in the National Interest of India

Yashoda Reddy
Siva Reddy
Thanjai Nalankilli

[First Published: June 2000; Updated July 2018]

OUTLINE

Abbreviation
1. Banned Meetings, Removed Posters, Secret Decisions and a Dirty Secret
2. Background
3. India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Minority in Sri Lanka
4. What is India's National Interest vis-a-vis the Sri Lankan Conflict
5. Possible Outcomes of the Sri Lankan Conflict
6. A Historical Perspective of India-Sri Lanka Relations
7. Assessment of each Possible Outcome of the Sri Lankan Conflict

Abbreviation

LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

1. Banned Meetings, Removed Posters, Secret Decisions and a Dirty Secret

People have the right to speak up against government policies, even against foreign, military and defense policies. That is what demarcates a democracy from a dictatorship. In Nazi Germany, everyone had to support the Feuhrer's (Hitler's) foreign policy and military adventures. There was no room for dissenting voice or dissenting advice. A similar situation is in effect in India for now almost a decade vis-a-vis India's policy towards the Sri Lankan conflict. Anyone voicing dissent over Indian government's irrational phobia about an independent Tamil Eelam is called anti-Indian at best, harassed and arrested at worst. Even the most powerful politician in the state of Tamil Nadu fears to give unqualified support for Tamil Eelam; he has to double talk, issue clarifications, etc. etc., lest he be labeled anti-national and his elected state government dismissed by the Hindi region politicians who control the Indian Central Government.

Recently (in May 2000) a proposed public meeting in support of Tamil Eelam was banned in the small town of Chidhambaram, Tamil Nadu, and those who went to attend the meeting were arrested, claiming that the meeting would disturb the peace. How would a public meeting attended by a few thousand people in a small town disturb the peace? An anti-Tamil-Eelam politician demanded that a Cable Television Company be shut down for anti-national activities because it broadcast video clips of people gathering for the meeting.

While the few rabidly anti-Tamil-Eelam newspapers with mass circulation carry highly inflammatory editorials and articles against independence for Tamil Eelam, those who challenge these views are banned from organizing public meetings or post posters. Editors of smaller publications that print pro-Eelam articles are harassed by police.

An important foreign policy with respect to Sri Lanka is not allowed to be debated in public but decisions are being made by a few behind closed doors in secrecy and even some allied political leaders from Tamil Nadu are misled about the course of action being taken. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee said that India would never recognize an independent Tamil Eelam and had set a course of secret military actions that would help the Sri Lankan military if it were to reach a point of collapse (hiding those actions from even some of the ruling-coalition allies from Tamil Nadu).

The Prime Minister said that Tamil Eelam would be against the national interest of India. He did not elaborate but his surrogates asserted that an independent Tamil Eelam would destabilize Tamil Nadu, destabilize India, create separatists aspirations in Tamil Nadu and throughout India and break up India. They would not allow any debate as to why and how a tiny nation (Tamil Eelam) in the neighboring island, with a population about one-hundredth of it, could do all this to the "regional superpower", that is India. As we noted before, a meeting organized to bring the counter point of view was banned; posters expressing the counter point of view were removed and those who put up the posters were arrested thus freeing the playing field for the few rabidly anti-Tamil-Eelam newspapers to spread their points of view without challenge. In this respect, in the context of Indian government's policy towards the Sri Lankan conflict, India resembles more like Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union where only views supporting the dictator's policies are allowed to be voiced.

We will establish in this article the irrationality of Indian government's decision to do all it can to prevent the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam, even if it were to be achieved with the blood and sweat of the people, with no help from India or others. If the publicly stated reasons for Indian government's phobia against Tamil Eelam are irrational, invalid and without basis, is there are unstated, dirty secret for Indian government's actions. Is it to hide this dirty secret that the Government of India makes every effort to muffle the voices that challenge the publicly stated reasons and expose the real reason to the public? This dirty secret is exposed in Chapter 1, where we established that the publicly stated reasons are irrational and without merit.

2. Background

(EDITOR'S NOTE: Those who are familiar with the Sri Lankan conflict may skip this section and go to Section 3.)

Sri Lanka is a small island nation south of India. The southern region of the island is occupied historically by Sinhalese, who claim that their ancestors came from Bihar, India. It would seem that there was no contact between the people who migrated to Sri Lanka and the people of Bihar after the migration. The languages (Bihari and Sinhalese)

are different though there may be a hidden common link. Biharis are now mostly Hindus while Sinhalese are mostly Buddhists. Their cultures are different.

The northern and eastern regions of the island are historically occupied by Tamils who are ethnically identical to south Indians, specifically Tamils of Tamil Nadu. There was constant interaction between Sri Lankan Tamils and the people of Tamil Nadu because they were separated only by the narrow Palk Straights which could easily be crossed in small boats. Their languages remain the same. Tamils in the island are principally Hindus with a good percentage of Muslims and Christians, the same as in Tamil Nadu. Their cultures are also similar.

In addition to the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils, there are also a very small percentage of Moors and Burghers. Moors are the descendents of Arab traders (and Arabs who married locally). They are of Muslim faith. Moors should not be confused with the Tamils who converted to Muslim faith. Burghers are the descendents of European colonists (and Europeans who married locally). They are Christians. Burghers should not be confused with Sinhalese or Tamils who converted to Christianity.

After successive European colonial rules, Britain gave independence to Sri Lanka in 1948. Because of their numerical majority in the Sri Lankan parliament, the Sinhalese systematically amended and rewrote the constitution and enacted laws that were discriminatory and oppressive to the minority. Peaceful protests by the Tamil minority were met with police brutality. Thousands of Tamils were also massacred in half-a-dozen race riots, some incited by the government and the Buddhist clergy and all passively watched by the police giving a free hand to the Sinhalese thugs to loot, torture, rape and murder Tamils in the thousands (in some cases police even participated in the orgy of violence against the Tamils). This led to the demand for a separate nation for the Tamil minority in their traditional homeland in the north and east. As democratic means failed (politicians supporting independence won almost all seats from the Tamil region) and government oppression continued, Tamils took to arms and thus the birth of armed freedom fighters. This gained momentum after the 1983 race riots, the worst ever. The LTTE emerged as the dominant fighting force challenging the Sri Lankan army. We will skip the various battles, successes and losses. India armed the LTTE first (1983-1987), tried unsuccessfully to disarm it after getting from the Sri Lankan government some concessions beneficial to India's security and interests (1987-1990), the armed conflict continues to this day.

3. India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Minority

India has a special interest in Sri Lanka. Not only is the small island nation located just miles from its southeastern coast, the minority Tamils are ethnically identical to the Tamils of its southern state Tamil Nadu. We will not consider the close ethnic bond that exists between the Tamils of India and the Tamils of Sri Lanka in the following analysis because the Hindi belt politicians who essentially control the foreign and military policies of India do not much care about the sentiments India's Tamil population. So we will look at India's policy towards the Sri Lankan conflict from the point of view of what is good

for India as a whole without any regard to the special long-time ethnic bond that exist between southern India, especially Tamil Nadu, and the minority Tamils of Sri Lanka.

4.What is India's National Interest vis-a-vis the Sri Lankan Conflict

India has hostile, or at best, "non-friendly" relationship with every one of its northern neighbors. In case of a major war with any of its enemies, present or future, from far or near, it would not be surprising if all of them support India's enemy. They are prone to give landing facilities, docking facilities and other logistical support. It is in India's national interest not to have its only southern neighbor hostile to it either. India wanted to have Sri Lanka as a "client state" that depends on India and accepts India's dictate in foreign and military affairs. "After all, it is a tiny island nation next to the giant India", so thought Indian policy makers. But Sri Lankan leaders had their own mindset and thumped their nose at India from the very beginning as the British colonial rule ended in 1948. While officially nonaligned, India "leaned" towards the Soviet Union during cold war years. Like most small nations next to a giant and powerful neighbor, Sri Lanka distrusted and feared India. It needed some powerful friends, even if from far off, and thus leaned towards the United States of America. It also tilted towards India's archenemy in the north, Pakistan. During the 1991 India-Pakistan war over the then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), Sri Lanka allowed Pakistan to refuel its Air Force planes on way from West Pakistan to East Pakistan in Sri Lanka; a clearly anti-Indian stance. India could not do anything about it.

The rise of armed Tamil fighters in Sri Lanka presented a golden opportunity to India. India armed and trained the fighters (1983-1987), not to help them achieve their goal of an independent Tamil Eelam but to put indirect pressure on Sri Lanka to give up its "unfriendly" stance towards India. It paid off. In 1987, in exchange for India calling off the Tamil fighters as if they were India's hired guns, Sri Lanka secretly granted extraordinary concessions to India, including Sri Lankan agreement not to give docking facilities at Trincomalee harbor to nations that India considered hostile. (What has it to do with the internal conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil minority is yet to be explained by the Indian government.) (The secret agreement was exposed by a newspaper.) When LTTE refused to lay down arms, India sent its army to forcefully disarm it (1987-1990). Unable to do it, Indian troops left Sri Lanka in 1990 and Sri Lanka unilaterally decided that its secret promises to India null and now foreign ships are welcome in Trincomalee harbor whether India approves of it or not. Sri Lanka also reneged on the other concessions it made to India in the secret 1987 agreement. India could not do much about it. It cannot annex Sri Lanka to India by military force. It would become an untouchable in the world community. Sri Lanka still maintains a fake friendly relationship with India because the Tamil freedom fighters (LTTE) are still strong and are capable of taking on the Sri Lankan army; Sri Lanka does not want India to help them in anyway or recognize an independent Tamil Eelam in the same way as it recognized Bangladesh in 1971. Keeping this background briefing in mind, what is in India's national interest vis-a-vis the Sri Lankan conflict?

5. Possible Outcomes of the Sri Lankan Conflict

What are the possible outcomes of the Sri Lankan conflict once it finally ends, whether in 6 months, 6 years or 16 years? Which of those outcomes are in the best interest of Indian security needs? Is India striving towards such an outcome that would be in India's national interest? If not, why? These questions will be explored in the rest of this article.

We see 4 possible outcomes.

OUTCOME 1: The Sri Lankan Army and the LTTE reach a protracted military stalemate, so LTTE and Sri Lankan government reach a fair agreement, and everyone lives happily ever after in the island.

OUTCOME 2: The Sri Lankan Army and LTTE reach a protracted military stalemate, so LTTE and Sri Lankan government reach a fair agreement, the Sri Lankan government reneges on the agreements gradually after LTTE disarms, and the majority Sinhalese continue to discriminate and oppress the minority Tamils.

OUTCOME 3: Sri Lankan Army routs the LTTE and the majority Sinhalese continue to discriminate and oppress the minority Tamils.

OUTCOME 4: LTTE routs the Sri Lankan Army, gains control of the entire traditional Tamil homeland in the north and the east, and declares an independent Tamil Eelam.

We need to look at the effects of these 4 outcomes in the context of Sri Lankan behavior in the past.

6. A Historical Perspective of India-Sri Lanka Relationship

As we described in Section 4, Sri Lanka viewed the much larger and powerful neighbor India with suspicion and fear ever since independence, and its attitude was hostile or at best "unfriendly." There was a change in Sri Lanka's attitude towards India around the mid-1980s. This was the time that Tamil freedom fighters gained enough strength capable of challenging the Sri Lankan Army. Suddenly Sri Lanka changed its stance towards India from "unfriendly" to "friendly" because it wanted India to stop helping the Tamil freedom fighters and start helping the Sri Lankan military. India's help to the Sri Lankan military continues to this day (overtly between 1987-1990 by sending troops to Sri Lanka, then covertly until recently by intercepting LTTE arms supply in international waters and by supplying arms, training and intelligence to Sri Lankan military, and again more overtly since April 2000 by promising to evacuate Sri Lankan soldiers if they were surrounded by LTTE in the battle for Jaffna). Sri Lanka pretends to be India's "friend" while keeping its line open with India's regional rival China as well as India's sworn enemy Pakistan.

The question Indian policy makers have to ask is, "Will Sri Lanka continue to be "pro-India" once the LTTE threat ends?" A friend who works in Indian Foreign Ministry in Delhi told one of the authors, "Once LTTE is out of the picture, Sri Lanka will turn

totally hostile to India. They blame India for everything that is going on there. They hate India for it. Once LTTE is out, it would be payback time, big time payback." We think that top policy makers in the Indian government know this. In May 2000, former Indian Central Government minister Subramaniam Swamy said, "India should help Sri Lanka only if it agrees to allow India to station an Indian Army Division in Colombo (Sri Lankan capital) permanently so that it would not betray India again". (This is what the former Soviet Union did in Eastern European countries. Station Soviet troops there so that they obey Soviet dictates.) Subramaniam Swamy is not part of the Indian government now but it is believed that he has close ties with the foreign ministry and intelligence agencies at the highest levels. Is he sounding out the views of these agencies?

Will Sri Lanka accept the stationing of an Indian Army Division in its capital? If it is the only way they could continue to oppress the minority Tamils, they would agree but once LTTE is eliminated they would demand that the Indian Army leave (in the same way they demanded that the Indian army leave the Tamil areas in 1988 although they invited it in 1987). It will surely receive support from around the world because it is nothing different from the gunboat diplomacy of the days of colonial rule.

7. Assessment of Each Possible Outcome of the Sri Lankan Conflict

OUTCOME 1: The Sri Lankan Army and LTTE reach a protracted military stalemate, so LTTE and the Sri Lankan government reach a fair agreement, and everyone lives happily ever after in the island.

Though it is the best possible outcome for the people of Sri Lanka (Sinhalese and Tamils), it is a low-probability event because of the hardened feelings of hatred and distrust between the two communities. If this outcome does materialize, Sri Lanka no longer has an internal security threat. Only possible threat to Sri Lanka's sovereignty is its only neighbor India. Fearing India may somehow create a military intervention by creating surrogate rebels within the Tamil community or even among the disgruntled Sinhalese, it would be natural for Sri Lanka to enter into open or tacit security arrangements with India's enemies and offer them military facilities when they need it. Former Indian Central Government ministers like Subramaniam Swamy suggesting that the Sri Lankan parliament vote to annex Sri Lanka to India and that a division of the Indian army be permanently stationed in the Sri Lankan capital lest Sri Lanka betray India are watched closely by Sri Lanka. Kashmir merger with India when it was under threat from "fighters" from Pakistan and India engineering the annexation of Sikkim are not lost on Sri Lankan leaders either.

In summary, "OUTCOME 1" is not in India's security interests in the long term, but it is in the best interest of the people of Sri Lanka. If India truly wants to see a just and peaceful resolution to the Sri Lankan conflict, it should let Norway which has no selfish interest in Sri Lanka mediate the talks between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. India's current attempt to muddle in the peace talks by offering to mediate while taking harshly anti-LTTE stance will only scuttle any meaningful talks and a long-term solution. Possibly that is what the Hindi rulers of the Indian Central Government want; a

peace settlement in which the Tamil minority gets very little and India gets some benefits like the infamous 1987 secret agreement between Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President J.R.Jayawardene (Who knows what is going on secretly between Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and Sri Lankan President Kumaratunga today?) In fact the Hindi rulers of India are not for a peaceful settlement that would grant the Tamils substantial autonomy like in Canada or Switzerland. The problem with this approach is that once LTTE lays down arms, Sri Lanka will thump its nose at India as it did in 1990. That is why former Indian minister Subramaniam Swamy sounded out options like Sri Lanka allowing an Indian Army Division stationed permanently in the Sri Lankan capital and Sri Lankan parliament voting to annex Sri Lanka to India in exchange for help in destroying the LTTE. As we discussed in Section 6, this is not going to happen.

OUTCOME 2: The Sri Lankan Army and LTTE reach a protracted military stalemate, so LTTE and Sri Lankan government reach a fair agreement, the Sri Lankan government reneges on the agreement gradually after LTTE disarms, and the majority Sinhalese continue to discriminate and oppress the minority Tamils.

This is a possibility too. In such a case, Sri Lanka would be suspicious that India would again want to create trouble for it by arming Tamils and extracting concessions from it, a la 1987. To preempt such attempts by India, it would crush ruthlessly any rise of Tamil militancy in its infancy and arm itself to the teeth from foreign forces not all of them friendly to India. Many Sinhalese believe, with good reason, that Sri Lanka's mistake was not taking Tamil militancy seriously in the mid-1970s and failing to arm the Sri Lankan military accordingly. Had they done so early, India would not have the opportunity to arm the militants and put pressure on it. The second time around, Sri Lanka will not make that mistake. India will not get any concessions but only hostility.

Thus "OUTCOME 2" is not in the national interest of India. But unfortunately India seems to try to steer events in this direction. Why? Is there a "dirty secret" behind it?

OUTCOME 3: Sri Lankan Army routs the LTTE and the majority Sinhalese continue to discriminate and oppress the minority Tamils.

It may not be an easy task to destroy LTTE because it has the support of the Tamil people living in the north and east as well as the many thousands who have fled as refugees to foreign lands, and undoubtedly its fighters are one of the most dedicated cadres anywhere in the world. But it could happen. If it does, this outcome has the same effect as "OUTCOME 2" from the perspective of India's national interest. Thus "OUTCOME 3" is not in the national interest of India. But India's actions seem to help the Sri Lankan Army defeat the LTTE. Why? Is there a "dirty secret" behind it?

OUTCOME 4: LTTE routs the Sri Lankan Army, gains control of the entire traditional Tamil homeland in the north and the east, and declares an independent Tamil Eelam.

Let us examine how this outcome fares vis-a-vis India's national interest. To understand the impact fully, one should look at the historical Tamil area (the proposed Tamil Eelam). Its coastline consists of the entire northern coast of the island, a little of the west coast in the north and a long stretch of the east coast deep into the south.

How will Sri Lanka react to the creation of Tamil Eelam? Whether Tamil Eelam is achieved with or without India's help and whether India recognizes it or not, Sri Lanka will blame India. What Sri Lanka would do vis-a-vis India would be no different from what it would do under Outcomes 1, 2 or 3 discussed earlier. It would establish military alliances with India's enemies. It would do so more blatantly now rather than more surreptitiously under outcomes 1, 2 or 3; but the result would be the same; suspicion and hostility to India.

While how Sri Lanka would behave is the same under all possible outcomes (outcomes 1, 2, 3 and 4), the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam changes the map of the region. A new nation is born and the national boundaries in South Asia are changed. Any military analyst would find that this change in the map is in the best interest of India, given Sri Lanka's fear and suspicion of India and its "unfriendly" stance towards India until the rise of Tamil militants (remember its tilt towards Pakistan and the United States while Pakistan was India's sworn enemy and India was leaning towards the Soviet Union during cold war years, and Sri Lanka's blatant hostile of allowing Pakistan Air Force planes to refuel in Sri Lanka during the 1971 India-Pakistan war). Creation of Tamil Eelam provides India with the one and only opportunity to have a permanently friendly neighbor to its immediate south and to checkmate Sri Lanka's unfriendly moves. Let us again reassert what we said earlier, "Sri Lanka had never been friendly towards India until the mid 1980s when Tamil freedom fighters became a threat to the Sri Lankan government. The ensuing "fake friendship" (pretend-friendship) that is continuing to this day will end and things will revert back to the pre-Tamil-freedom-fighters days of the 1960s and 1970s once the LTTE is destroyed and it no longer need to fear India helping the freedom fighters and thus indirectly threatening Sri Lanka. There is nothing India can do to the sovereign nation of Sri Lanka. Permanent stationing of an Indian Army Division in the Sri Lankan capital to ensure that Sri Lanka tows its line, as sounded out by the former Indian Minister Subramaniam Swamy recently, is not going to happen.

Creation of an independent Tamil Eelam right inside the island provides the only opportunity for India to checkmate Sri Lanka's unfriendly moves in the future. India cannot station permanently an army division in Sri Lanka, as sounded out by the former Indian minister Subramaniam Swamy, but India can have a friendly Tamil Eelam right inside the island permanently. All that would take is friendly relations and cooperation with Tamil Eelam. With the hostile Sri Lanka to the south, Tamil Eelam would want a powerful friend, an ally. The giant India on its north would be a natural ally. If you ask why would not Tamil Eelam be unfriendly to India as Sri Lanka is, the answer is that the present day Sri Lanka (or pre-Tamil-Eelam Sri Lanka) has only one neighbor, the giant India. Any threat or hegemony to it can come only from India and so it is naturally suspicious and fearful of India. Any nation under such situation would want to balance the power equation by seeking friendship with the giant neighbor' adversaries. That is

what Sri Lanka did until the threat from Tamil freedom fighters came and it needed India's cooperation to contain and destroy them. The situation of a free Tamil Eelam is different. It would have two neighbors, the angry and historical foe Sri Lanka to the south and India with long friendly relations (until recently) in the north. It would naturally tend towards India unless India rebuffs it. Thus Tamil Eelam would be a natural friend and asset to India.

In summary, an independent Tamil Eelam is in the national interest of India. So Indian government's recent statements that it would never recognize Tamil Eelam even if the Tamils get it on their own without any help from India goes contrary to India's national interest. This same view was held by previous governments under the Congress Party led United Front also. Why is the Indian government dead-set against Tamil Eelam although it is in India's national interest? Is there a dirt secret behind this hostility towards independence for Tamil Eelam?

NOTE: In Chapter 4, authors debunk the arguments by anti-Tamil-Eelam lobby that an independent Tamil-Eelam would destabilize and breakup India. Reference 1 discusses the why the Hindi rulers of India are opposed to an independent Tamil Eelam although it is in India's national interest.

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4.
Debunking the Anti-Tamil-Eelam Propaganda in India

Yashoda Reddy
Siva Reddy
Thanjai Nalankilli

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OUTLINE

Abbreviations

1. Introduction

2. False Propaganda 1: "Once Tamil Eelam is independent, LTTE will set out to Liberate Tamil Nadu from India"

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5. False Propaganda 4: "LTTE Trained the Tamil Retrieval Force to Create Problems in Tamil Nadu, They will do so again"

6. False Propaganda 5: "An Independent Tamil Eelam would Inspire the Various Minority Nationalities in India to Aspire for Independence and India would Breakup Like the Soviet Union"

7. False Propaganda 6: "LTTE is a terrorist Organization, it Will Promote Terrorism after the Independence of Tamil Eelam"

Abbreviations

LTTE - liberation Tigers of Tamil eelam
USA - United States of America

1. Introduction

A few anti-Tamil-Eelam editors, writers and commentators in the Indian media are listing all the ills that would befall on India if Tamil Eelam were to get independence in the Sri Lankan Island. While they repeatedly list these woes through their access to the mass media in India, the Government of India and the Tamil Nadu State Government are not allowing counter views to be voiced. They ban meetings, remove posters and label

anyone speaking up for Tamil Eelam as anti-Indian [See Section 1 of Chapter 1], We will debunk their oft-repeated statements in this article.

2. False Propaganda 1
"Once Tamil Eelam is independent, LTTE will set out to Liberate Tamil Nadu from India"

This propaganda goes like this: "If Tamil Eelam were to become independent, LTTE will set out to liberate Tamil Nadu to form a "Greater Tamil Eelam". We refer the readers to the article "The Myth of Greater Tamil Eelam" [Reference 1]. That article totally demolishes the ridiculous theory of Greater Tamil Eelam.

3. False Propaganda 2
"Once Tamil Eelam is independent, LTTE will Destabilize Tamil Nadu"

This is essentially the same false propaganda as the Greater Tamil Eelam scare but with a slightly different flavor.

We ask the anti-Tamil-Eelam lobby in India that is propagating this false propaganda, "Why would LTTE want to destabilize Tamil Nadu after it has achieved Tamil Eelam? What do they get out of it?" Only thing it gets out it would be India's wrath and possible retaliation such as India sending its Air Force to bomb targets in Tamil Eelam. Why would they want that for no good reason? Is simply does not make sense that LTTE would destabilize Tamil Nadu once Tamil Eelam is independent.

We ask these lobbyists, give us one reason why LTTE or any government of Tamil Eelam would want to destabilize Tamil Nadu--just one reason! Can anyone honestly say that LTTE is nothing but a goal-oriented organization? It does everything in a rational, goal-oriented manner--single-minded in achieving an independent Tamil Eelam. They do not do anything "just for the fun of it". Can anyone deny it? Once Tamil Eelam is independent, LTTE has no reason to destabilize Tamil Nadu. On the contrary they have every reason not to do it because if they do, it could bring military retaliation from India. So they are not going to do it.

4. False Propaganda 3
"LTTE Fought the Indian Army between 1987 and 1990, so We Should Never Support its Tamil Eelam Struggle"

Yes, LTTE did fight the Indian army between 1987 and 1990 in their home soil. They did not come to India and pick a fight with the Indian army or the Indian people. The only reason LTTE fought the Indian army between 1987 and 1990 was that it was on their soil and they concluded, rightly, that as long as the Indian army was there they could not achieve an independent Tamil Eelam.

We also point out that the Sri Lankan government secretly supplied LTTE with large quantities of arms and ammunition during that time to fight the Indian Army. At least

LTTE fought the Indian Army openly but the Sri Lankan government fought the Indian Army cowardly and secretly by helping LTTE. Don't tell us that it was a different government. If so, how do you know that the next Sri Lankan Government will not be hostile to India? Also, whenever it does not get its way with India, the Sri Lankan government threatens to go to India's archenemy Pakistan. Anti-Tamil-Eelam lobbyists may say, "Sri Lanka has to protect itself from LTTE, so it goes to Pakistan once India refuses to help". We ask, "LTTE fought the Indian army in its soil between 1987 and 1990 to protect its cherished goal of Tamil Eelam, so what is wrong with that?" You cannot selectively condemn LTTE and gloss over similar actions by Sri Lanka.

If India can forget Sri Lanka's treachery between 1987-1990 and now help the Sri Lankan military, why not forget about the war with LTTE? Is there a reason why they selectively remember LTTE actions and sweep Sri Lankan actions under the rug?

We also want to point out that "nations do not have permanent friends, they have permanent interests". We already established in Part I of this article that an independent Tamil Eelam is in the national interest of India. So why is the Indian Government opposing it because LTTE fought the Indian army to evict it from its soil between 1987-1990? Vietnam and the United States of America (USA) fought a bitter war for a decade and the latter lost some 50,000 soldiers but today they have cordial relations. So why can't India and Tamil Eelam (or LTTE) have cordial relations? Back in the 1950s, American Secretary of State Dean Rusk refused to shake hands with the (Communist) Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-Lai at the Bandung Conference. America fought a war with China over Korea in which thousands of soldiers died. Then in the 1970s, the President of United States Richard Nixon, a staunch anti-Communist went to China and shook hands with Chou-en-Lai's mentor Mao Tse-Tung because it suited its geopolitical strategy. Why can't Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee shake hands with LTTE leader Prabakharan in the national interest of India?

If Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Egyptian President Sadat, whose armies fought several bitter wars, can embrace each other and call each other friend, why can't India be friendly to LTTE? If Palestinian Authority Chairman Arafat and the Israeli Prime Minister can shake hands, why not Prabakharan and the Indian Prime Minister? Palestinians assassinated Egyptian President Sadat, but today Palestinians are embraced and supported by the Egyptian government? Nations do not have permanent friends or permanent enemies, nations have permanent interests. We have established in Part I that an independent Tamil Eelam is in India's national interest. Why is India opposed to it because of the hostilities during the late 1980s and the very early 1990s?

5. False Propaganda 4
"LTTE Trained the Tamil Retrieval Force to Create Problems in Tamil Nadu, They will do so Again"

The anti-Tamil-Eelam lobbyist would not tell when LTTE trained the Tamil Retrieval Force. This group, may be a few dozen Tamil Nadu Tamils, was formed sometime in the 1980s because they were disgruntled with Indian government's treatment of Tamil Nadu

and we believe that their aim was to liberate Tamil Nadu from India. LTTE is said to have trained, may be a dozen members of this group, between 1988 and 1990, when the Indian Army was on their soil and fighting them. It was obviously a tit for tat, "if you come and fight us in our land, we will cause you problems in Tamil Nadu." Once the Indian Army left their soil in 1990, LTTE no longer trained or in any other way supported any militant group in Tamil Nadu. So, arguments that LTTE would train Tamil Nadu militants once Tamil Eelam is independent are without merit. As we asked in Section 3, LTTE has no reason to ferment trouble in Tamil Nadu once Tamil Eelam is free. LTTE is a goal oriented organization; creating trouble in Tamil Nadu "just for the fun of it" is not their way--it never has been.

Also, why can't India forgive LTTE for training a dozen men from Tamil Nadu, if it is ready to forgive the Sri Lankan government of giving large quantities of arms and ammunition to LTTE to fight the Indian army?

6. False Propaganda 5
"An Independent Tamil Eelam would Inspire the Various Minority Nationalities in India to Aspire for Independence and India would Breakup Like the Soviet Union"

Separatist movement in Tamil Nadu has its origin well before the LTTE was formed, well before LTTE founder Prabakharan was born. The root cause for separatist tendencies in Tamil Nadu has to do with Hindi imposition and other inequities the Tamils feel. It has absolutely nothing to do with what is happening in Sri Lanka. Don't blame the LTTE for India's problems that started well before the birth of LTTE.

The same is true of separatist movements in Kashmir, Assam, Nagaland, Tripura, Punjab, etc. These movements did not get their inspiration from Tamil Eelam. Separatist tendencies in these regions are the result of real or perceived injustices and discriminations meted out to these people by the Indian Government.

If the independence of a small nation in the small Sri Lankan Island would cause the breakup of "mother India", then it is inevitable that India would break up whether there is a Tamil Eelam or not. Don't find a scapegoat in Sri Lankan Tamils for India's problems. If the "Indian Union" is so fragile that a sneeze in the tiny Sri Lankan Island would tear it apart, may be the Indian government should do a self analysis to see why there are separatist tendencies in India and address them. India's problems stem from inside and should be solved from inside, and not by crushing the independent movement of the long-suffering Tamil minority in Sri Lanka. India did not break up when Pakistan broke up into two. India did not break up when Soviet Union broke up into many. So why would India breakup just because Sri Lanka breaks up?

7. False Propaganda 6
"LTTE is a terrorist Organization, it Will Promote Terrorism after the Independence of Tamil Eelam"

We have already asked the question more than once, "Why would LTTE cause trouble in India after Tamil Eelam is free?" There is no reason to.

Look at history. Some of the national leaders of Israel were once considered terrorists. Did Israel foster terrorism after independence? No. Former Israeli Prime Minister Begin was implicated in the bombing of King David Hotel during the British rule? Did he promote terrorism when he became Prime Minister? No. African National Congress (South Africa) was considered a terrorist organization. Its leader Nelson Mandela was in jail for much of his adult life. Did the African National Congress or Nelson Mandela promote terrorism after coming to power in South Africa? No. In fact Nelson Mandela is now considered a leader of great moral authority. With such precedents, why do you think LTTE would promote terrorism after the independence of Tamil Eelam? There is no reason. It is just another made-up false reason from the anti-Tamil-Eelam lobby.

Reference

1. The Myth of Greater Tamil Eelam, "Tamil Nadu and the Battle for Tamil Eelam (Chapter 1)," edited by Thanjai Nalankilli, Free e-book available where you downloaded this book.

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5.
Did India Help Sri Lankan Tamils until 1987?

Yashoda Reddy
Siva Reddy
Thanjai Nalankilli

[First Published: May 2001]

OUTLINE

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Abbreviations

EPRLF - Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front
EROS - Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students
LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
PLOTE - Peoples Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam
TELO - Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization
USA - United States of America

1. Introduction

It is generally believed inside and outside of India, and indeed spread by the Indian Government, that India helped Sri Lankan Tamil freedom fighters until 1987, and that India turned against the LTTE only after it refused to disarm and accept the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord signed by the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President J.R. Jeyawardene in July 1987. We will show the falsity of this claim. India was not really helping the Sri Lankan Tamils but **it was engaged in a very dubious, selfish, cunning and destructive strategy** of bleeding Sri Lanka until the Sri Lankan Government acceded to certain demands India had to achieve its military and foreign policy objectives in South Asia.

2. India's Cunning Strategy of Bleeding Sri Lanka

The Indian Government and much of the Indian press repeatedly claim that India actively supported the Tamil struggle against Sinhala oppression until 1987. They point to the military training and weapons India gave to the various freedom fighters, such as the EPRLF, EROS, LTTE, PLOTE and TELO, between 1983 and 1987.

Yes, India did aid the Tamil freedom fighters. Yes, they did train them including training in bomb making. Yes, they did supply them with weapons. The question is, "How much of an aid and to what purpose?" India aided the Tamil freedom fighters, not to help the Tamil struggle against Sinhala oppression but **to destabilize Sri Lanka enough to convince** the Sri Lankan Government that unless it gives in to certain Indian demands with respect to India's military and foreign policy objectives, India could see to it that the Sinhala-Tamil war continues and possibly Sri Lanka breaks up into two countries--a Sinhala nation and a Tamil nation. We should look at this in view of Sri Lanka's anti-Indian activities in the foreign policy front in the preceding years.

During the cold war years (which were still cold in the 1980s), India leaned towards the then Soviet Union and Sri Lanka towards the United States of America (USA). India was irked by its tiny southern neighbor thumping its nose at the big brother India but could do very little to make Sri Lanka accept its dictate. During the India-Pakistan war in 1971, Pakistani Air Force planes have to fly around India to the south to move arms and supplies from West Pakistan to East Pakistan. Without Sri Lanka's permission for these planes to refuel in Sri Lanka, Pakistan's ability to wage war against India would have been severely hampered. Sri Lanka did allow Pakistan to refuel in Sri Lanka - a very hostile action against India during that war. Although Indian officials were fuming at Sri Lanka, India could do very little about it. Any direct military action against Sri Lanka would have brought world condemnation and possible American military intervention on the side of Sri Lanka. India has to find some other way, short of military intervention, to force Sri Lanka to accept its dictate in foreign policy and military matters.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, India was also upset over the close relationship developing between Sri Lanka and the USA. The possibility of Sri Lanka offering facilities for the American Navy at its Trincomalee port (the largest natural harbor in the world) and the expansion of the Voice of America Station in Sri Lanka (with the possibility of America setting up electronic listening posts at the Voice of America facility) was looked at with deep concern by India. Again, there was nothing India could do.

Like a ripe fruit falling on one's lap, opportunity knocked in the form of the rise of Tamil freedom fighters in Sri Lanka in the late 1970s and early 1980s. India decided to arm and train the Tamil freedom fighters **just enough to seriously threaten the Sri Lankan Army** in the north and east of the island (the traditional Tamil home land that Tamils call "Tamil Eelam"). India never aided the freedom fighters enough to defeat the Sri Lankan army but just enough to bleed the army. The level of support was carefully planned to meet this strategy. By Indian calculations, if the Sri Lankan Government agrees to accede to India's demands on the military and foreign policy fronts, India can stop the aid to freedom fighters. The freedom fighter, not strong enough to dislodge the Sri Lankan army from their homeland (northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka), will not be able to do much. (Things went wrong for India because LTTE did not depend solely on Indian arms and training. It had its own independent arms procurement operations and training without the knowledge of Indian intelligence agencies.)

3. Air Drop over Jaffna

At this point we would like to point out a sub-drama India staged in the mid- 1980s. At that time much of Jaffna peninsula was under Tamil control (LTTE control). Sri Lankan Government had cut off much of the food supply to Jaffna as it is doing today to LTTE-controlled Vanni region. Saying that it would feed the people of Jaffna, India sent a plane with some food packets and dropped them into Jaffna. The reason for this display of air might was not to feed the starving people of Jaffna (the food packets would not even feed a few dozen people for a day while the Jaffna population was in the hundreds of thousands) but to send a forceful message to Sri Lanka that India could violate Sri Lankan air space with impunity and send Air Force planes, and by implication, that India would not hesitate to violate Sri Lankan sovereignty and send Indian troops into Sri Lanka if Sri Lanka did not accede to its demands. Sri Lanka did get the message and soon signed the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord in 1987.

India's intention was not the feeding of the Jaffna Tamils but sending a forceful message to the Sri Lankan Government is all too evident by the fact that a single plane dropped food just enough to feed a few dozen people for a day. If it really wanted to help the Tamil people it would have sent a ship loaded with food or a dozen large Air Force transport planes loaded with food (as America did when it sent food to West Berlin when it was blockaded by the Soviet Union back in the 1960s). There was no risk to Indian ships or planes; Sri Lanka had a tiny navy and air force back in 1987 that could not cause any damage to Indian ships and planes.

India does know how to send food to blockaded people. Remember April-May 2001. Sri Lankan troops were virtually encircled by the LTTE in Jaffna and the possibility of the troops starving arose. Sri Lanka did not have the navy or air force sufficient to supply them with food. What did India do? It kept a dozen or so large air force transport planes loaded with food and medicine on the ready at the Thiruvananthapuram (Trivandrum) Airport, the closest airport to Jaffna, ready to take off if the Sri Lankan troops were fully encircled. These planes would be doing repeat trips, should the need arise. Compare it with a single pane loaded with a few packets of food sent to Jaffna in the 1980s (although the number of starving people were much more than the Sri Lankan troops cornered in Jaffna). India was not feeding the Jaffna Tamils; it was sending a message to the Sri Lankan Government!

So any talk that India helped the Tamil freedom fighters until 1987 and that India airdropped food to feed the starving Jaffna Tamils was nonsense. These were part of Indian attempt to force Sri Lanka to agree to meet its foreign policy and military demands. If any one has any doubt about it, all they have to do is see what India did when Sri Lanka finally said "yes" to India's selfish demands. The result was the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord. Read the accord and, especially, the accompanying letter from the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to the Sri Lankan President Jeyawardene. You will see India had no interest in helping the Sri Lankan Tamil minority but only interested in

having Sri Lanka accede to its selfish demands that have nothing to do with the Tamil minority. We will explain it in the next section.

4. India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987 and Tamil Grievances

How does the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord address minority Tamil grievances of discrimination in jobs and education, police powers and government-sponsored Sinhalese colonization of the Tamil areas in the north and east? Nothing. All that the accord said was that there would be provincial council(s) for the north and east with unspecified powers? The powers to be devolved to the provincial council is to be negotiated between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil minority AFTER the Tamil freedom fighters lay down their arms. Considering the very basic fact that the only reason that the Sri Lankan Government was even considering provincial councils was because of the armed strength of the freedom fighters, once they lay down their arms what kind of powers will the Sri Lankan Government devolve to the provincial councils? Will the provincial council have power over the further Sinhalese colonization of the Tamil areas in the north and east? How much of law and order will be devolved to the provincial councils? What taxes will the provincial councils be allowed to collect to fund its projects? These critical points were left open in the accord. **A devolution agreement without the specification of what powers will be devolved is not worth the paper it is written on.** These critical points were not only left open in the accord but the accord specifically states that they will be decided only AFTER the Tamil freedom fighters lay down their arms. So, with the freedom fighters disarmed, what powers will be devolved to the provincial council would depend on the "goodwill" of the Sri Lankan Government. What kind of a "goodwill" can the Tamil minority expect from a government that unleashed police brutality on peaceful demonstrations against discrimination and allowed Sinhalese mob violence of murder, rape and arson against the Tamil minority to "teach" them a lesson?

While matters of critical importance to the Tamil minority were left to be resolved later, issues of importance to both Sri Lanka and India were clearly spelled out in the accord and were to take effect immediately (within weeks). What did the Sri Lankan Government want? It wanted the Tamil freedom fighters disarmed. What its military could not do in the battlefields, it got through the accord. The accord says that the freedom fighters should lay down their arms immediately and, if not, the Indian army (the fourth largest army in the world at that time) would forcibly disarm them.

What did India get? We discuss it in the next section.

5. What did India get from the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987?

India and Sri Lanka tried to keep an exchange of letters annexed to the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord a secret but it was exposed by an Indian newspaper. Those letters spell out what India will get from Sri Lanka in exchange for stopping all aid to the freedom fighters and disarming them (either voluntarily by the fighters or forcibly by the Indian army).

Two signed secret letters were exchanged between the Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka on the same day they signed the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord (July 29, 1987). These letters were kept secret not only from the world abut also from the Tamil leaders of Sri Lanka (that itself shows the under-handed nature of Indian Government dealings). Soon an Indian newspaper got hold of these letters and published them. These letters were then published in a number other papers also and are now common knowledge. Here is the relevant **extract from one of the secret letters** (from the Prime Minister of India to the President of Sri Lanka):

You had, during the course of our discussion, agreed to meet some of India's concerns as follows:

1.
Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understanding about the relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel with a view to ensuring that such presence will not prejudice Indo-Sri Lanka relations.

2.
Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests.

3.
The work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee oil tank will be undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka.

4.
Sri Lanka's agreement with foreign broadcasting organizations will be reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or intelligence purposes.

India got everything it wanted from Sri Lanka in exchange for stopping the aid to the Tamil freedom fighters and disarming them (forcibly if necessary). Because of the then on-going cold war between the United States of America and Soviet Union, and India's close relationship with the latter, India looked at the United States with suspicion. India did not want American military or intelligence personnel stationed at its southern neighbor Sri Lanka (America had military and intelligence presence at its northern neighbor Pakistan); India got Sri Lanka not to station such personnel in its soil per item (1) in the letter. **What has it to do with Tamil grievances?** Did the Tamil freedom fighter shed blood for this? India did not want American Navy at Trincomalee harbor so close to its southeastern coast. Item (2) in the letter stipulates that Sri Lanka would not do that. What has it to do with Tamil grievances? Did the Tamil freedom fighter shed blood for this? India did not want America setting up electronic listening posts at its southern neighbor in the guise of expanding its Voice of America facilities in Sri Lanka. Item (4) of the letter prevents Sri Lanka from allowing it. What has it to do with Tamil grievances? Did the Tamil freedom fighter shed blood for this? India also did not like the idea of American or European companies operating the Trincomalee oil tank, a

potentially lucrative business. Item (3) of the letter gives that concession to India. What has it to do with Tamil grievances? Did the Tamil freedom fighter shed blood for this?

6. India did not help the Sri Lankan Tamils

The above-discussed letter from the Prime Minister of India to the President of Sri Lanka signed on the same day (July 29, 1987) as the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord is proof and evidence that the reason India armed and trained the Sri Lankan Tamil freedom fighters was to force Sri Lanka to accede to its selfish military and foreign policy demands and not to help the Tamil minority of Sri Lanka achieve the legitimate rights denied to them. We hope that those who vocally repeat that India helped Sri Lankan Tamils until 1987 would keep quiet from now on.

7. India could have Achieved Everything by Supporting Tamil Eelam

In Part I of this series of articles we established through a careful and thorough analysis that an independent Tamil Eelam is in the national interest of India. We will add to it here in the background of the above-discussed letter from the Indian Prime Minister to the Sri Lankan President. As noted in Section 5, India wanted four concessions from Sri Lanka in exchange for stopping the aid to Tamil freedom fighters and disarming them. Could India have achieved the same by supporting an independent Tamil Eelam? Yes, **let us elaborate**.

1)
India did not want foreign military and intelligence personnel (though not named, India was referring to the United States of America) stationed in its southern neighbor Sri Lanka. An independent Tamil Eelam would be a buffer between India and Sri Lanka. Tamil Eelam, with its lengthy coastline, would have been an excellent buffer.

2)
India did not want foreign naval presence at Trincomalee, the largest natural harbor in the world. It so happens that Trincomalee is in the Tamil region (Tamil Eelam). Had India been friendly to the Tamil people, instead of bleeding them and betraying them, the independent Tamil Eelam would have gladly accepted this proposition. In fact, in July 1987 in New Delhi, leader of the predominant freedom-fighting group (LTTE) Prabaharan told Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that India could have the exclusive use of Trincomalee harbor if it supported the creation of independent Tamil Eelam.

3)
India wanted participation in the operation of the Trincomalee oil tank. India would have got this from Tamil Eelam. After all, LTTE leader Prabaharan had promised exclusive use of the Trincomalee port to Indian Navy.

4)

India did not want electronic listening post at its southern neighbor Sri Lanka in the guise of Voice of America. An independent Tamil Eelam would have been a buffer between India and Sri Lanka.

In spite of the fact that India could have achieved everything it wanted in military and foreign policy matters more reliably by supporting an independent Tamil Eelam, India went through a circuitous and dubious strategy of forcing the Sri Lankan Government to accede to its military and foreign policy demands. (We discussed in Chapter 3 that the agreement reached with Sri Lanka could not be relied upon and that Sri Lanka would never be a trust-worthy ally to India. Once the Tamil freedom fighters are no longer a threat and the Tamil minority is subdued, Sri Lanka would renege on the agreement forced upon it and go back to its earlier hostile posture.)

Since India's military and foreign policy interests are best served by an independent Tamil Eelam rather than a united Sri Lanka (as discussed in detail in Chapter 3) why is the Indian Government pursuing an anti-Tamil Eelam policy? Is there a "dirty secret" behind Indian Government's irrational policy towards the Sri Lankan Crisis? Yes, see Chapter 1 for detailed discussion.

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6.
Indian Government Double-Dealings in the Sri Lankan Ethnic Conflict: 1983-1987

Thanjai Nalankilli

[First Published: September 2003]

OUTLINE

1. Introduction
2. Naval Training to Sri Lankan Military
3. Transit of Weapons to Sri Lanka
4. Cricket Ball Message to Sri Lanka
5. What was India's Game?

1. Introduction

Indian government and much of the Indian press perpetuate the view that the Indian Government was solidly behind Eelam Tamils of Sri Lanka and helped them by arming and training Tamil freedom fighters (Tamil militant groups) between 1983 and 1987. This view is not the truth and the whole truth. Indian government and the Indian press conveniently sweep under the carpet Indian government help to the Sri Lankan military at the very same time.

Although the Sri Lankan military was getting much of its weapons and training from other countries, India was also offering some assistance to Sri Lankan military between 1983-1987, keeping its options open and signaling to the Sri Lankan Government that it was not at all tied to the Tamil people and could switch sides if it serves it purpose. We will discuss it a little further later in this article.

2. Naval Training to Sri Lankan Military

Indian Navy was training Sri Lankan naval personnel in India between 1983 and 1987. If India was behind the Tamil cause, why was it training the Sri Lankan Navy? Against whom was it training the Sri Lankan Navy? There were only two naval forces the Sri Lankan Navy could conceivably encounter. One is the Indian Navy, the other is Tamil militant boats. Things get even more interesting. At the very same time India was training Sri Lankan Navy personnel, India was also training Tamil militants how to surreptitiously place explosives under Sri Lankan naval vessels to blow them up. In return for training the militants in naval warfare, India wanted the militants to watch activities at Sri Lanka's Trincomalee harbor and report it to India. India was (and still is) highly suspicious and concerned about possible American naval facilities at this large natural harbor capable of docking American warships.

3. Transit of Weapons to Sri Lanka

At the time India was training and arming Tamil militants, a plane bound for Sri Lanka from another country made an emergency landing at Thiruvananthapuram (Trivandrum) Airport in Southern India because of engine troubles. When Indian officials looked into the plane they found weapons of war. When news of this leaked out, leaders of Tamil Nadu asked the Indian Government to confiscate the weapons because they were meant for use against Tamil militants in Sri Lanka (the militants India was training and sending to Sri Lanka to fight the Sri Lankan military). But the Indian Government allowed the weapons to go to Sri Lanka. If India was truly in sympathy with the Sri Lankan Tamil struggle for their legitimate rights, would India have acted this way? This is yet another piece of evidence of India's true color.

Countries do stop transit of weapons through their soil, water or airspace if the weapons are to be used against friends. Here is an example. During the brief India-Portugal war over the Portuguese colonial possession Goa in the 1960s, Portugal sent arms and reinforcements to India. The ship had to pass through Suez Canal. The Egyptian Government refused to permit the ship to pass through the canal because India was a friendly country. That is what true friends do.

4. Cricket Ball Message to Sri Lanka

During the days of apartheid in South Africa, many countries including India refused to play cricket games with the South African team as a form of protest. India went one step further. It also refused to play with teams that played with the South African team. While India was doing this to show its displeasure against apartheid, India was playing cricket with the Sri Lankan team during 1983-1987. If the Indian Government truly sympathized with the oppressed Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, it would have refused to play with the Sri Lankan team.

Sports events and games have been used to send signals to foreign governments. It was a ping-pong game (table tennis game) between the American and Chinese teams in the 1970s that sent a signal to China that America was willing to close ranks with China. It led to the rapprochement between America and China after quarter century of frozen relationship. India was also sending a message to Sri Lanka that it was not really with the Tamil minority, it was willing to reconsider its position and switch sides if it gets what it wants from Sri Lanka. Training of Sri Lanka Navy personnel and allowing transit of weapons to Sri Lanka are also part of this sinister game India was playing.

5. What was India's Game?

India never wanted the Tamil minority to gain independence or even get substantial devolution within a federal Sri Lanka. The 1987 India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord is a testament to it [see Section 4 of Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion]. As Tamil militant groups gained momentum after the 1983 race riots in Sri Lanka, India found an opportunity to train them as its **"attack dogs"** to threaten Sri Lanka. When Sri Lanka agrees to India's selfish geopolitical demands (not to allow expansion of Voice of

America in Sri Lanka, not to allow American warships in Sri Lanka's Trincomalee harbor), India would call off the "dogs". This was what happened in 1987. Sri Lanka acceded to India's geopolitical demands and India asked the militant groups to disarm. When one group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), refused to disarm, war broke out between Indian troops sent to enforce the accord and the LTTE.

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7.
An Analysis of IPKF-LTTE War (1987-1990)

Thanjai Nalankilli

[First Published: November 2011]

OUTLINE

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2. India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Minority
3. A Critical Assessment of IPKF-LTTE War (1987-1990)

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5. Concluding Remarks
6. Why Anti-Tamil Policies After the End of LTTE?

Abbreviations

EPRLF - Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front
EROS - Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students
IPKF - Indian Peace Keeping Force
LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
PLOT - People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam
TELO - Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization
TULF - Tamil United Liberation Front

PROLOGUE

Is India using the IPKF-LTTE war (1987-1990) as an excuse to justify its anti-Tamil actions starting before 1987 and continuing as of now?

1. Background

[If you are familiar with the Sinhala-Tamil ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, you may skip to Section 2.]

Ever since the British left Sri Lanka and Sri Lanka achieved freedom in 1948, minority Tamils complain about discrimination by the Sinhala majority. Peaceful Tamil protests were met with Sinhala police brutality. Thousands of Tamils were also massacred in half-a-dozen race riots, some incited by the government and the Sinhala Buddhist clergy and all passively watched by the police giving a free hand to the Sinhalese thugs to loot, torture, rape and murder Tamils in the thousands (in some cases police even participated in the orgy of violence against the Tamils).

The dominant Tamil political party Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF)'s demand for a federal structure of governmemnt for Sri Lanka was opposed by the Sri Lankan government controlled by majority Simnhalese. The Tamil reaction was The Vaddukottai Resolution of May 1976 that demanded an independent Tamil country (called Tamil Eelam) in the traditional Tamil homeland in Northern and Eastern regions of the Sri Lankan island. TULF contested the 1977 Sri Lankan parliamentary election on the basis of The Vaddukottai Resolution and won an overwhelming majority in the Tamil homeland. Peaceful protests by Tamils were again met with police brutality. Having failed to achieve their goal throgh peaceful means, Tamil youths formed armed militant groups (Tamil freedom fighters). 1983 saw one of the worst race riots against Tamils (you can read the murders, rapes and tortures in many reports found on the Internet). Consequently the armed Tamil groups increased in size and military capabilities. LTTE emerged as the dominant and most committed of all the Tamil groups. After 1987 it became the only militant group fighting for Tamil Eelam. What started as guerrilla fighting group, LTTE changed into a regular military force and fought the Sri Lankan military until its defeat in 2009.

2. India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Minority

India's policies and actions in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict has been decidedly anti-Tamil in nature. Not only India provides military assistance to Sri Lanka [Reference 1] it also provides much needed financial assistance. Indian state of Tamil Nadu has a population of about 60 million and they are linguistically, culturally and ethnically tied to Sri Lankan Tamils. Whenever someone in Tamil Nadu voices opposition to India's anti-Tamil policies, Indian government counters it by bringing up the war between Indian army sent to the northeastern regional of the island (Tamil Eelam), which India calls the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Is India using the IPKF-LTTE war (1987-1990) as an excuse to justify its anti-Tamil actions starting before 1987 and continuing as of now?

3. A Critical Assessment

3.1 Before 1987

To start with, India's anti-Tamil actions precede the IPKF-LTTE war that took place between 1987 and 1990. This is discussed in some detail in Chapter 5. So IPKF-LTTE war cannot be India's reason for its anti-Tamil actions.

3.2 1987: The India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord

India reached an agreement with Sri Lanka on the ethnic conflict and put it in the form of India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987. Both Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President J.R. Jeyawardene. Sri Lanka got Indian assurance that it would have the Tamil militant groups disarmed, if necessary using Indian military. India got Sri Lankan commitment that it would not allow foreign navy into its ports without Indian consent. Tamils got nothing except promise of unspecified devolution of powers to one or two Tamil provinces after the Tamil militants are disarmed (thus have no leverage over Sri Lankan government). In essence Tamils got nothing after all the bloodshed and sacrifices. A detailed discussion of the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987 may be found in Chapter 5. What Sri Lanka could not do over the past several years, India did it for them--that is, India promised to disarm Tamil militants which the Sri Lankan military could not do in those years. This anti-Tamil action happened before the IPKF-LTTE war.

3.3 1987: Illegal Arrest of LTTE Leader Prabhakaran in New Delhi

All the Tamil militant groups except the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) agreed to the accord. (The accord was prepared by India and Sri Lanka without the participation or consent of the militant groups; They were given an overview of the accord just days before the accord. The accord itself was not shown to them.) India invited LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran to its capital New Delhi to discuss his concerns with officials and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. He went to New Delhi on July 24, 1987. There he was shown a copy of the agreement for the first time. When he refused to agree to the terms of the agreement, he was **put under house arrest ("hotel arrest") at Ashoka Hotel in New Delhi**. This is outrageous. Indian Government invited Prabhakaran to New Delhi to discuss the accord. He was an invited guest. But he was arrested for not agreeing to the accord he was shown for the first time. You arrest criminals. His crime was not signing on the dotted lines but stood up for his people--the Tamil minority of Sri Lanka.

India tried to find some second level LTTE leader to accept the accord but it could not find a single traitor to do so. LTTE leaders in Jaffna refused to talk to Indian military leaders stationed in Tamil Eelam until Prabhakaran safely returns to Jaffna. India reluctantly flew Prabhakaran back to Jaffna. This all happened before the IPKF-LTTE war. LTTE has not done a single thing against India so far, even after the provocative arrest of its leader in New Delhi.

3.4 1987: Indian Army in the Traditional Tamil Region of Sri Lanka

LTTE fighters did not come to India and attack Indian soldiers. It is Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi who sent the Indian army into the traditional Tamil region of Sri Lanka to disarm the Tamil militants.

3.5 1987: Other Anti-LTTE Actions

Now a large contingent of Indian army is stationed in Tamil Eelam; India called this military force Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). All militant groups surrendered their weapons. LTTE said that the protection of Tamil people was now in the hands of India. While all militant groups except LTTE went silent, LTTE asked India for clarification of the terms of the India-Sri Lanka accord, especially what powers would be devolved to the Tamil province. India did not like the fact that LTTE was not accepting the accord meekly like the other groups. India thought that Tamil militant groups would behave like lap dogs obeying its orders without question. LTTE was rather a guard dog protecting the interests of the Tamil people. Yet there was no war between LTTE and IPKF. There was peace. LTTE and India were talking on how to implement the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord. While India is engaged in talks with LTTE leaders, India was secretly rearming the other militant groups. It is revealed by Indian army officer in command of IPKF, Major General Harkirat Singh, in his book published in 2007 [Reference 2].

Is the Indian government re-arming non-LTTE militants to fight the Sri Lankan Army? No, it is rearming non-LTTE militant groups to fight LTTE as India's surrogates. Why? LTTE is the only one questioning the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord and pointing how Tamils are getting very little or nothing out of it. So India wants to destroy LTTE. It did not want the Indian army to directly attack LTTE because it would cause protest among the tamil people of North-eastern Sri Lanka (Tamil Eelam) but also in India's Tamil region Tamil Nadu. So India was planning to use non-LTTE Tamil militant groups to attack and weaken or destroy LTTE so they would stop qustioning India about the accord. India used the Tamil militants to act as its attack dogs against Dri Lanka so it would accept India's demands, now it is using non-LTTE militants as its attack dogs against LTTE.

These anti-LTTE activity was taking place before the IPKF-LTTE war.

3.6 Attempt to Murder LTTE Leader Prabhakaran in Jafna

As we mentioned in the previous section, LTTE and India were talking on how to implement the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord. LTTE leaders used to go to IPKF headquarters in northern Sri Lanka to talk to IPKF officers including the IPKF Commander Major General Harkirat Singh. On the night of 14/15 September 1987, Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka J. N. Dixit phoned IPKF Commander Major General Harkirat Singh and asked him to arrest or shoot Pirabakaran when he came for the meeting. Dixit told the instruction was from Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. After talking (phoning) to his superior Lieutenant General Depinder Singh, Harkirat Singh told Dixit that he would not shoot people in the back when they were coming for a meeting under the white flag. But for the professionalism and integrity of Major General

Harkirat Singh, Prabhakaran might have been murdered in cold blood on the night of 14/15 September 1987. Major General Harkirat Singh revealed it in an interview with Rediff on the Net in 2000 [Reference 3] and, in more detail, in his 2007 book [Reference 2]. J. N. Dixit denied that he ordered the murder of Prabhakaran. A more detailed discussion of this murder plot may be found in Chapter 9.

This alleged murder incidence happened before the IPKF-LTTE war.

3.7 Final Remarks on IPKF-LTTE War

Now we have established that India's anti-LTTE activities precede the IPKF-LTTE war. LTTE never attacked any Indian military or civilian personnel before the IPKF-LTTE war. Only reason for India's anti-LTTE activities was that LTTE acted as the defender/protector of Tamil interests and would not accept the India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987.

4. Sri Lanka's Anti-Indian Activities

4.1 Has Sri Lanka Ever Killed Indian Soldiers?

As noted before, one excuse India gives for it's anti-LTTE, anti-Tamil actions was that LTTE killed IPKF soldiers during the IPKF-LTTE war. We already established in Section 2 that India's policy have been anti-Tamil even before the IPKF-LTTE war and LTTE never killed an Indian before. Let us look at Sri Lanka. Is Sri Lanka a true friend of India? Has Sri Lanka ever killed Indian soldiers before? Let us examine.

Sri Lanka never had a direct military conflict with India and Sri Lanka never fired a shot against Indian soldiers, as far as we know. But Sri Lanka is responsible for hundreds of deaths of Indian soldiers. Sri Lanka was like a snake in the grass. It strikes and kills unexpectedly and slides away. Here are couple of examples.

4.2 During the India-Pakistan War in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971

India and Pakistan fought a major war in 1971, primarily in East Pakistan (that later became Bangladesh). West and East Pakistan were not land-linked. They are separated by miles of Indian territory. Pakistan had to move military supplies and soldiers from West to East by going around the Indian peninsula. The only landmass on this circuitous route is Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka allowed Pakistani aircrafts to land and refuel in Sri Lanka. This is a decidedly anti-Indian action on the part of Sri Lanka. This is an unprovoked anti-Indian action because there were no quarrels or conflicts between India and Sri Lanka at that time. How many additional Indian soldiers died in the 1971 war because of this Sri Lankan action? 10, 20, 100? Whatever the number, Sri Lanka was indirectly responsible for those deaths. Yet India acted against the interest of Tamils and in support of Sri Lanka. Why are Indian government actions in Sri Lanka always anti-Tamil (1980s - today)?

4.3 Indian Soldiers in Northeastern Sri Lanka (1987-1990)

India sent its military into the Tamil region of Sri Lanka (northeastern Sri Lanka) in 1987 and stayed there until 1990 to enforce the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987. Although Indian military captured territories held by LTTE, it was unable to destroy LTTE. The newly elected Sri Lankan President Premadasa started peace negotiations with LTTE and asked Indian military to leave immediately. India refused and said that it would leave at an unspecified later date. Angered by Indian refusal, Premadasa secretly supplied truckloads of weapons and ammunition to LTTE to fight the Indian military in northeastern Sri Lanka. LTTE and Indian military were at war with each other. Indian soldiers were killing LTTE and LTTE was killing Indian soldiers. Sri Lanka, while not fighting the Indian military openly as LTTE did, surreptitiously supplied weapons and ammunition to kill Indian soldiers. At the same time it was keeping "friendly" relations with India.

How many additional Indian soldiers died because of Sri Lankan weapons? 10, 20, 100, 200? Whatever the number, Sri Lanka was indirectly responsible for those deaths. Yet India acts against the interest of Tamils and in support of Sri Lanka. Why are Indian government actions in Sri Lanka always anti-Tamil (1980s - today)?

5. Concluding Remarks

Indian Government gives the IPKF-LTTE War (1987-1990) and Indian soldiers' deaths during that war as a reason for its anti-Tamil policies and activities. We have established that India's anti-Tamil policies started before the IPKF-LTTE war and thus it could not be the reason for India's anti-Tamil policies and actions. We also show that Sri Lankan government was indirectly responsible for the death of many Indian soldiers in 1971 and 1987-1990.Yet India continues with its anti-Tamil activities. We also want to point out that Indian soldiers killed LTTE fighters and LTTE fighters killed Indian soldiers in their traditional homeland. This is what happens in wars. Warriors on both sides get killed. What is not acceptable is that Indian soldiers raped Tamil women and massacred unarmed Tamil civilians. These "war crimes" have been well documented by international human rights organizations and may be found at their websites or archives.

6. Why Anti-Tamil Policies Even After the End of LTTE?

If LTTE killing IPKF soldiers during the IPKF-LTTE War (1987-1990), why is India continuing with its ant-Tamil policies and actions even after the demise of LTTE in May 2009? It conclusively shows that Indian rulers (that is, Hindi politicians) have anti-Tamil views and it has nothing to do with LTTE actions.

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8.
Rajiv Gandhi Assassination and India's Role in the Sri Lankan Ethnic Conflict

Thanjai Nalankilli

[First Published: July 2014]

OUTLINE

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1. Background
2. Why India's Anti-Tamil Actions Before the Assassination?
3. Attempt to Assassinate LTTE Leader Prabhakaran in Jafna in 1987
4. IPKF War Crimes in Sri Lanka
5. What About Sri Lanka's Anti-Indian Actions?
6. Sri Lankan Support for Pakistan During the 1971 India-Pakistan War
7. Indian Soldiers in Northeastern Sri Lanka (1987-1990)
8. Concluding Remarks
9. Why Anti-Tamil Policies Even After the End of LTTE?

Abbreviations

IPKF - Indian Peace Keeping Force
LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

PROLOGUE

Purpose of this article is not to condone the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Purpose is to discuss if India is using this assassination in 1991 to justify its anti-Tamil actions starting in the mid 1980s and continuing as of now.

1. Background

Indian policies and actions in the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka between the majority Sinhalese and minority Tmils has been decidedly anti-Tamil in nature. During the armed conflict (war) between the Sri Lankan (Sinhala)military and the Tamil militant group LTTE, India provided military assistance to Sri Lanka [Reference 1]. It also provided much needed financial assitance. Indian state of Tamil Nadu has a population of about 60 million and they are linguistically, culturally and ethnically tied to Sri Lankan Tamils. Whenever someone in Tamil Nadu voices opposition to India's anti-Tamil policies, Indian government counters it by bringing up the 1991 assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (presumably by Sri Lankan Tamil rebels, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)). Thus Indian government justifies its support for the Sri

Lanka. For the purposes of this article, we will consider that LTTE was responsible for the assassination.

Is India using Rajiv Gandhi assassination merely as an excuse to justify its anti-Tamil actions? Let us examine it critically.

2. Why India's Anti-Tamil Actions Before the Assassination?

India's involvement in te Sri Lankan ethnic conflict and war did not start on May 21, 1991--the day former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated. It goes back to, at least, early 1980s. Chapter 7 provides a brief discussion of India's anti-Tamil actions between the early 1980s to 1987 when Indian military went to Sri Lanka to disarm the Tamil militant groups and enforce the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987. Section 3 of **Chapter 7 discusses**:

India's Anti-Tamil Actions Before 1987
Anti-Tamil Nature of The India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987
Illegal Arrest of LTTE Leader Prabhakaran in New Delhi in 1987
Indian Army in the Traditional Tamil Region of Sri Lanka in 1987
Other Anti-LTTE Actions before the IPKF-LTTE War in 1987
Attempt to Murder LTTE Leader Prabhakaran in Jafna in 1987

We will not discuss them here, except to highlight the last point in the next Section.

3. Attempt to Assassinate LTTE Leader Prabhakaran in Jafna in 1987

The news of India's alleged attempt to assassinate LTTE leader Prabhakaran when he went for peace talks to the Indian military headquarters in Northen Sri Lanka comes directly from the Indian military commander in Sri Lanka in 1987, Major General Harkirat Singh. References to his interview and book and a brief quote from his book are provided in Chapter 9.

4. IPKF War Crimes in Sri Lanka (1987-1990)

(IPKF - Indian Peace Keeping Force) Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi sent the Indian army into the traditional Tamil region of Sri Lanka to disarm the Tamil militants and enforce the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987. India called this military force "Indian Peace Keeping Force" (IPKF). Some Tamils called it the "Innocent People Killing Force" (IPKF).

During the IPKF-LTTE war in Northeastern Sri Lanka (1987-1990), Indian soldiers killed LTTE fighters and LTTE fighters killed Indian soldiers. This is what happens in wars. Warriors on both sides get killed. What is not acceptable is that Indian soldiers raped Tamil women and massacred unarmed Tamil civilians. These "war crimes" have been well documented by international human rights organizations and may be found at

their websites or archives. These aactivities happened before the Rajiv Gandhi assassination in 1991.

5. What About Sri Lanka's Anti-Indian Actions?

One reason India gives to justify its anti-Tamil, pro-Sri Lankan government actions is the Rajiv Gandhi assassination in 1991. We already discussed several anti-Tamil actions of India prior to 1991.

Now, what about Sri Lanka's anti-Indian actions? Read the following 2 sections.

6. Sri Lankan Support for Pakistan During the 1971 India-Pakistan War

[This section is a duplicate of Section 4.2 of Chapter 7. If you you have already read it, skip to Section 7.] India and Pakistan fought a major war in 1971, primarily in East Pakistan (that later became Bangladesh). West and East Pakistan were not land-linked. They are separated by miles of Indian territory. Pakistan had to move military supplies and soldiers from West to East by going around the Indian peninsula. The only landmass on this circuitous route is Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka allowed Pakistani aircrafts to land and refuel in Sri Lanka. This is a decidedly anti-Indian action on the part of Sri Lanka. This is an unprovoked anti-Indian action because there were no quarrels or conflicts between India and Sri Lanka at that time. How many additional Indian soldiers died in the 1971 war because of this Sri Lankan action? 10, 20, 100? Why those soldiers' lives were conveniently forgotten and India helping Sri Lanka?

7. Indian Soldiers in Northeastern Sri Lanka (1987-1990)

[This section is a duplicate of Section 4.3 of Chapter 7. If you have already read it, skip to Section 8.] India sent its military into the Tamil region of Sri Lanka (northeastern Sri Lanka) in 1987 and stayed there until 1990 to disarm Tamil militants and enforce the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987.

Although Indian military captured territories held by LTTE, it was unable to destroy LTTE. The newly elected Sri Lankan President Premadasa started peace negotiations with LTTE and asked Indian military to leave immediately. India refused and said that it would leave at an unspecified later date. Angered by Indian refusal, Premadasa secretly supplied truckloads of weapons and ammunition to LTTE to fight the Indian military in northeastern Sri Lanka. LTTE and Indian military were at war with each other. Indian soldiers were killing LTTE and LTTE was killing Indian soldiers. Sri Lanka, while not fighting the Indian military openly as LTTE did, secretly supplied weapons and ammunition to kill Indian soldiers. At the same time it was keeping "friendly" relations with India. How many additional Indian soldiers died because of Sri Lankan weapons? 10, 20, 100, 200? Whatever the number, Sri Lanka was indirectly responsible for those deaths. Yet India acts against the interest of Tamils and in support of Sri Lanka. Why are Indian government actions in Sri Lanka always anti-Tamil (1980s - today)?

8. Concluding Remarks

One reason India gives for its anti-Tamil policies and action in Sri Lanka is the 1991 assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi allegedly by LTTE. In our opinion this is merely an excuse to pacify protests in Tamil Nadu opposing India's anti-Tamil actions in Sri Lanka. If India's actions are based on lost Indian lives, let us look at the balance sheet. Presuming LTTE was responsible for Rajiv Gandhi assassination, total number of Indian lives lost during the assassination is 8. So death count due to LTTE actions is 8.

What about the death count from Sri Lankan actions? As described in Sections 6 and 7, Sri Lanka is responsible for the death of dozens (may be, hundreds) of Indian soldiers. If lost Indian lives is the criterion for supporting one side or the other in the Sri Lankan ethnic war, then India should not be supporting the Sri Lankan government. Both sides, Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, are responsible for Indian deaths, then why support one side? Real reason is that Indian government does not want Tamil people getting any type of self-rule either as an independent country or as a province in a truly federal Sri Lanka. They cannot tell this real reason to the people of Tamil Nadu. That is why Rajiv Gandhi assassination is used as a convenient excuse for its anti-Tamil actions.

9. Why Anti-Tamil Policies Even After the End of LTTE?

If LTTE killing Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 is the reason for India's anti-Tamil policies and actions in Sri Lanka, why is India continuing with its ant-Tamil policies and actions even after the demise of LTTE in May 2009? It conclusively shows that Indian rulers (that is, Hindi politicians) have anti-Tamil views and it has nothing to do with LTTE actions. Chapter 1 discusses the reason for India's anti-Tamil actions in Sri Lanka.

Reference

1. Indian Duplicity in Military Aid to Sri Lanka as Impotent Tamil Nadu Watches: Part I, "Tamil Nadu and the Battle for Tamil Eelam (Chapter 2)," edited by Thanjai Nalankilli, Free e-book available where you downloaded this book.

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9.
Did Indian Government Order the Murder-Assassination of Prabhakaran during Peace Talks in 1987 (before the IPKF-LTTE War Started)?

Thanjai Nalankilli

[First Published: December 2017]

Important Note

No one shall be considered guilty until and unless they were found guilty by an impartial court of law. In this article we present information from respected news sources and ask certain questions that follow logically from that information. We are not in a position to answer all those questions. We request the Indian Government to conduct an open and impartial inquiry and seek answers to those questions. Until that time no one mentioned in this article shall be considered guilty of any crime.

OUTLINE

Abbreviations
Prologue
1. Background
2. LTTE Leader Prabhakaran in New Delhi
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Abbreviations

COAS Chief of Army Staff
EPRLF - Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front
EROS - Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students
GOC - General-Officer-Commanding
IPKF - Indian Peace Keeping Force
LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
OFC - Overall Force Commander
PLOT - People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam
TELO - Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization
UN - United Nations

Prologue

We start with an except from Indian Major General (retired) Harkirat Singh's book [Reference 1], "Intervention in Sri Lanka: The I.P.K.F. Experience Retold", Manohar

Publishers & Distributors (India), 2007 (188 pages) (available for purchase in hardcover and paperback on the Internet) Major General Harkirat Singh was the commander of the ndian Army in Sri Lanka (IPKF) in 1987: "On the night of 14/15 September 1987, I received a telephone call from Dixit, directing me to arrest or shoot Pirabakaran when he came for the meeting. Telling Dixit that I would get back to him I placed a call to the OFC. Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh directed me to tell Dixit that we, as an orthodox Army, did not shoot people in the back when they were coming for a meeting under the white flag. I then spoke to Dixit in Colombo and conveyed the message, emphasising that I would not obey his directive. I pointed out that the LTTE supremo had been invited by the IPKF in order to find a solution to the problems in the implementation of the Accord. Dixit replied, He [Rajiv Gandhi] has given those instructions to me and the Army should not drag its feet, and you as the GOC, IPKF will be responsible for it. The next morning I received a call from Lt. Gen. B.C. Joshi, the then Director General Military Operations, who supported my stand on Dixits directive. However, the COAS, Gen. Sundarji, expressed his annoyance. In fairness to Rajiv Gandhi, Dixits claim that he spoke on his behalf must be rejected. Dixit was prone to bragging and braggadocio."

1. Background

Those who are familiar with the history of the war in Sri Lanka between Sri Lankan Government and the minority Tamil fighters (up to and leading to the direct military involvement of India in 1987) may skip this section and go to Section 2.

India and its tiny southern neighbor Sri Lanka (formerly known as Ceylon) were part of the British Empire in South Asia. British rule ended in India on August 15, 1947 and in Sri Lanka on February 4, 1948. Sri Lankan parliament was (and is) dominated by the majority Sinhalese race. Sinhala politicians enacted constitutional provisions and laws that were discriminatory towards minorities. The largest minority, the Tamils, protested peacefully. Government put down the peaceful, nonviolent demonstrations most brutally. Sinhala mobs raped, murdered and pillage Tamil areas as government security forces looked on or joined in. (These are documented by impartial sources and even the recent Sri Lankan Governments do not dispute it.)

Since the nonviolent demonstrations did not yield any fruit but brought in violence against the Tamil minority, Tamil youths formed armed guerrilla groups in the 1970s in the predominantly Tamil areas in the north and east (Tamils call this Tamil region in the island as "Tamil Eelam"). Notable among these groups were Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS), Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOT) and Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO). The most organized and the most effective among them was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), usually referred to as the "Tamil Tigers".

India tried to fish in the troubled waters by arming and training these groups. This was not out of the goodness of its heart to help the long-suffering Tamil minority but to exert pressure on Sri Lanka to tow its line in foreign affairs and economic matters, especially

the former. India carefully rationed its help to the Tamil groups, **just enough to bleed the Sri Lankan military** but not sufficient to defeat it. Both Tamil militant groups and the Sri Lankan army bled even as India watched on the sidelines. After several years of waging a "no-win war" against the Tamil militant groups, Sri Lankan Government decided to accede to Indian demands and agreed to sign the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord in 1987.

An analysis of the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987 may be found in Chapter 5 (see Sections 4 and 5). We would merely mention here that the accord requires the disarming of Tamil militants without any specific promise of powers to be devolved to the Tamil Province. Essentially Tamils get nothing but a promise of unspecified devolution, Sri Lanka has the Tamil fighters disarmed, and India gets everything it wants from Sri Lanka, clearly spelled out in the two secret letters (later unearthed by Indian newspapers) signed by the Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka on the same day they signed the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord (July 29, 1987). You can read the relevant excerpts of these letters in Chapter 5.

2. LTTE Leader Prabhakaran in New Delhi

All the Tamil militant groups except the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) agreed to the accord. (The accord was prepared by India and Sri Lanka without the participation or consent of the militant groups; They were given an overview of the accord just days before the accord. The accord itself was not shown.) India invited LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran to its capital New Delhi to discuss his concerns with officials and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. He went to New Delhi on July 24, 1987. There he was shown a copy of the agreement for the first time. When he refused to agree to the terms of the agreement, he was put under house arrest ("hotel arrest") at Ashoka Hotel in New Delhi. This is outrageous. Indian Government invited Prabhakaran to New Delhi to discuss the accord. He was an invited guest. But he was arrested for not agreeing to the accord he was shown for the first time. Suppose Chinese government invites Indian Prime Minister (PM) to Chinese capital Peking to discuss the India-China border dispute and arrests him in Peking because Indian PM would not signed a border agreement he was shown for the first time, how would Indians feel? How would governments around the world react? Yet, that is what happened to LTTE leader Prabhakaran in 1987. **A despicable, disgraceful, cowardly stab in the back by Rajiv Gandhi government.**

While Prabhakaran was still under hotel arrest, Rajive Gandhi went to Sri Lankan capital Colombo and signed the agreement. (Prabakaran saw it on television that the accord had been signed on July 29, 1987.) Upon signing the agreement, 54-th Division of the Indian army was sent to the Tamil region of the island under the command of Major General Harkirat Singh. Preparations for this movement was going on for a month. **According to an Indian Army colonel,** Indian military lifted more tonnage (of military equipment and personnel) by land and sea into Sri Lanka than in any theatre of operation during the Second World War. India called its military forces in Sri Lankan Tamil region as IPKF (Indian Peace Keeping Force). In number of soldiers and fire power IPKF exceeded LTTE by a huge margin. When the Indian commander approached the LTTE to talk, they

refused to talk until their leader Prabaharan was released. Tamil people also protested the "holding" of Prabakharan in New Delhi. Seeing that they could not find a willing second-level LTTE leader to endorse the accord and thus sideline LTTE leader Prabhakran, Indian Government released Prabhakaran on August 2, 1987 and flew him back to Jaffna (well after the accord was signed and Indian troops were in place in the Tamil regions of Sri Lanka).

Seeing the massive Indian Army deployment and not wanting to take on the fourth largest army in the world, Prabaharan reluctantly agreed to the accord. He made no secret of his reservations about the terms of the accord at his public speech before a large crowd in Jaffna on August 4, 1987.

If the Indian Government thought that LTTE would quietly accept the Indian dictate like the other militant groups, that was not to be. LTTE questioned the specific details of the accord that were left vague. They complained about Sri Lankan Government not fully complying with certain terms of the accord. A former LTTE commander, Thileepan, went on an indefinite fast because the accord did not meet the aspirations of the Tamil minority and that even the limited provisions of the accord were not being implemented. Even after repeated pleas by Tamils, Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka J.N. Dixit refused to meet with Thileepan and discuss the grievances. Thileepan fasted to death on September 26, 1987.

3. Alleged Order to Murder (Assassinate) Prabhakaran Came Before the IPKF-LTTE War

The alleged attempt on LTTE leader Prabhakaran's life by Indian Government official(s) took placed under this general background of September 1987. In short, although LTTE stopped all military actions (per the accord), it continued to champion the Tamil minority's concerns. It is important to remember that the alleged attempted murder of Prabhakaran took place when there was no armed conflict between the LTTE and the Indian Army (IPKF) or the Sri Lankan Army; everything was quiet militarily. LTTE commanders were regularly visiting IPKF Head Quarters to talk with IPKF commanders and Indian civilian officials about the implementation of the accord that India thrust on the Tamil minority. War between LTTE and IPKF started on October 6, 1987, well after the alleged murder attempt in September 14, 1987. The murder attempt took place during the above mentioned talks about the implementation of the accord.

4. "Shoot Prabhakaran", Ordered the Indian High Commissioner

Immediately after the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord on July 29, 1987, India landed its troops and military equipment into the predominantly Tamil north-eastern region of Sri Lanka (or "Tamil Eelam" as Tamil people call it). As we stated in Section 1, Indian military lifted more tonnage (of military equipment and personnel) by land and sea into Sri Lanka than in any theatre of operation during the Second World War. LTTE reluctantly agreed to the accord because it did not want to go to war with the fourth largest army in the world. There were no physical hostilities between LTTE and

the Indian military (not even minor clashes of any sort) between July 29 and October 6 of 1987. LTTE leaders used to visit Indian Army Head Quarters in Northern Sri Lanka to discuss aspects of the accord with Indian Army commanders and civilian officials. There were differences of opinion between the Indian Government and the LTTE about the implementation of the accord. While all other militant groups accepted the accord meekly, LTTE was trying to protect Tamil interests as best as it could under the circumstances (with the heavy presence of Indian troops in Sri Lanka and vast reserves just across the Palk Straights in India). LTTE was raising questions about Sri Lankan Government's implementation of the accord (or lack there of) and organizing peaceful, Gandhian public protests against it. Though LTTE was now acting like a political organization (and not a militant group), India considered the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran as a thorn on its side because LTTE would not quietly accept the Indian Government positions like the other groups.

Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka at that time was Mr. Jyotindre Nath Dixit (High Commissioner is comparable to ambassador). Commander of the Indian military in Sri Lanka was Major General Harkirat Singh. His headquarters at that time was in Northern Sri Lanka. As mentioned earlier, Prabhakaran and other LTTE leaders used to visit the Major General at the latter's headquarters in Northern Sri Lanka. Their relationship was professional and cordial. They respected each other. The Major General would later say, "**The LTTE is not a simple soul to crack**. A hard nut. Lead by Prabhakaran, a highly-motivated man. He has only one aim, Eelam."

As we noted before, the Indian Government considered Prabbhakaran a thorn at its side; but for him everything would go smoothly as India planned. So Indian government decided to murder him, kill him, assassinate him when he came to IPKF Headquarters in Northern Sri Lanka for discussions with Indian Major General Harkirat Singh. There was no war between LTTE and IPKF yet. All is peaceful. This was what happened, in Indian Major General Harkirat Singh's own words (we are repeating the same excerpt we started this article):

"On the night of 14/15 September 1987, I received a telephone call from Dixit, directing me to arrest or shoot Pirabakaran when he came for the meeting. Telling Dixit that I would get back to him I placed a call to the OFC. Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh directed me to tell Dixit that we, as an orthodox Army, did not shoot people in the back when they were coming for a meeting under the white flag. I then spoke to Dixit in Colombo and conveyed the message, emphasising that I would not obey his directive. I pointed out that the LTTE supremo had been invited by the IPKF in order to find a solution to the problems in the implementation of the Accord. Dixit replied, He [Rajiv Gandhi] has given those instructions to me and the Army should not drag its feet, and you as the GOC, IPKF will be responsible for it. The next morning I received a call from Lt. Gen. B.C. Joshi, the then Director General Military Operations, who supported my stand on Dixits directive. However, the COAS, Gen. Sundarji, expressed his annoyance. In fairness to Rajiv Gandhi, Dixits claim that he spoke on his behalf must be rejected. Dixit was prone to bragging and braggadocio." [Excerpt from: Reference 1] Here are the

abbreviations used in the excerpt [COAS - Chief of Army Staff, GOC - General-Officer-Commanding, OFC - Overall Force Commander]

We want to emphasize that this attempted murder-killing-assassination of LTTE leader Prabakaran took place before LTTE and IPKF started fighting each other. It was peacetime. Prabakaran was going to IPKF Headquarters for talks.

High Commissioner J. N. Dixit denied he ever asked Major General Harkirat Singh to murder/assassinate Prabhakaran.

5. Two Unanswered Questions

A Major General of the Indian Army is saying that an Indian high-commissioner/ambassador asked him to shoot a foreign rebel leader when he came to his office for peace talks. The high-commissioner denies it. So the **first question**: Who is lying? Major General Harkirat Singh or High-Commissioner J. N. Dixit?

If J. N. Dixit is lying, did he ask the Major General to shoot Prabhakaran on his own or was he relaying an order from the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi? That is the **second question**.

We do not know the answers, only a few people do. Indian government could have easily obtained a definitive answer for all to know, especially foreign governments.

In the opinion of this writer, Indian government could have easily got the truth out. Major General Harkirat Singh told about the murder attempt in an interview to Rediff on the Net in Year 2000 [Reference 2]. India could have appointed a retired High Court judge to investigate the matter; the two key individuals, Harkirat Singh and J. N. Dixit were alive at that time. The judge would have taken testimonies of both Major General Harkirat Singh and High-Commissioner J. N. Dixit under oath with penalties for lying under oath. According to Major General Harkirat Singh, he talked about the assassination attempt to two other Indian Army officers, namely, Lieutenant General Depinder Singh and Lieutenant General B.C. Joshi. Judge would have taken testimony under oath from these two Indian Army Generals also. The truth about what happened in Northern Sri Lanka on the night of of 14/15 September 1987 could have been conclusively established for all to know, especially foreign governments.

India plays a good citizen amongst the international community. It has contributed to army officers and soldiers to **United Nations (UN) Peace Keeping Forces** in many countries. Is it not important for the United Nations and those countries to know if liars are commanding these forces? India wants a permanent seat in the **UN Security Council**. Is it not important for member countries of the United Nations to know if Indian ambassadors are secretly ordering assassination of foreign leaders during peace negotiations?

References

1. Major General (retired) Harkirat Singh, "Intervention in Sri Lanka: The I.P.K.F. Experience Retold", Manohar Publishers & Distributors (India), 2007 (188 pages); available for purchase in hardcover and paperback on the Internet.

2. https://www.rediff.com/news/2000/mar/31lanka.htm

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10.
Indian Rulers and the Sri Lankan Ethnic Conflict

Thanjai Nalankilli

[First Published: February 2004]

This writer has always held the view that the Indian Government would be against the Tamil minority of Sri Lanka obtaining their full legitimate rights within a truly federal Sri Lanka or in an independent country. Indian Government has done everything diplomatically, financially and militarily to thwart the Tamil minority win a military victory and establish an independent country or the Tamil minority get meaningful devolution through peace talks with the Sri Lankan Government. Some of Indian Government's anti-Tamil activities are discussed in other chapters.

Reasons for Indian Government's active opposition to the Tamil minority of Sri Lanka obtaining their full legitimate rights has nothing to do with India's security or national integrity. Chapters 3 and 4 systematically demolished these arguments. These articles clearly showed that even the formation of an independent country in northeastern Sri Lanka is in no way a threat to India's security or integrity. So the question of a truly federal Sri Lanka (with the northeastern Tamil region getting maximum possible devolution) being a threat to India's security or integrity does not arise at all. However India seems to be out to covertly sabotage such a peaceful settlement through talks.

What is the real reason for Indian Government's hostility to a peaceful or military solution that would allow the Tamil minority to live as first class citizens in a federal Sri Lanka or an independent country? To understand the real reason, one should understand who the real rulers of India are. Real power in India is in the hands of Hindi politicians from the "Hindi belt" of northern India. Prime Ministers come and go, political parties win and lose, but the real power always rests with the Hindi politicians who directly or indirectly hold the reigns of the major all-India parties such as the Congress Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Reference 1 provides some insight into how Hindi politicians control the Indian Government.

The reason for Hindi politicians dislike (may be even enmity or hatred) for Tamil Nadu in southern India, and now by extension to Tamils of Sri Lanka is discussed in another article. Suffice is to say here that Indian government is not against an independent Tamil Eelam or a truly federal Sri Lanka has nothing to do with India's national interests, as discussed in Chapters 1-3 but with Indian rulers' (Hindi politicians) biases against Tamils.

Indian rulers are not only opposed to the creation of an independent country "Tamil Eelam" in the northeastern regions of the island, they are **opposed to any meaningful devolution of power to the minority community in the northeast**. While the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord, that India pushed through in 1987, mentioned devolution, it pointedly left out what powers should devolved. Thus the accord is an empty document as for as devolution is concerned. It was to be negotiated between the Sri Lankan

Government and the Tamil minority after the Tamil militant groups totally disarm. Only leverage Tamil minority had was the military power Tamil militants wielded. Once the militants disarm, as required by the India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987, Tamil people would be at the mercy of Sinhala politicians similar to what is was before the rise of Tamil militants (pre-1983).

India is interfering even in the current peace process that started in 2002. Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe is so afraid that the the Indian Government would interfere if a peace settlement not to India's liking is reached, that after each session of peace talk he or one of his ministers rush to India to brief Indian rulers and get their view. No wonder Sinhala hardliners including the militant Buddhist monks want to remove Norway and place India as the facilitator of the peace talks. Given Indian rulers' anti-Tamil bias, **Indian facilitation could never achieve what Norway could**.

In order for the peace process to succeed, India should have no say on any agreement reached between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil minority. Lasting peace can be achieved only if the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are willing to accept something less than an independent country and the Sri Lankan Government is willing to accept maximum possible devolution to the Northeastern Province. Any Indian interference in the peace process would sabotage the peace process. Norway, America, Canada, Japan, European Union and other countries that want to see a just and long lasting peace in Sri Lanka should influence Indian rulers not to interfere in the peace process.

Give peace a chance!

Reference (updated in August 2019)

1. Who Rules India?, "Hindi Imposition Papers: Volume 1 (Chapter 10)," edited by Thanjai Nalankilli, Free e-book available where you downloaded this book.

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11.
Who Made Indian Prime Minister the Lord Emperor of Sri Lanka?

Thanjai Nalankilli

[First Published: May 2003]

India is one of the very few countries, if not the only country, that has or had unfriendly relationship with every one of its neighbors. Former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (or Indra Gandhi) declared that any South Asian country needing military assistance should first approach India and only if it refuses should that country seek help elsewhere. This was the infamous "**Indira doctrine**" (or Indra doctrine) asserting Indian supremacy over South Asian nations.

It was under this Indira Gandhi doctrine that her son and successor Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi sent Indian troops to Sri Lanka in 1987 to put down minority Tamil freedom fighters, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), whom his mother and he trained and armed in the prior years. Sri Lanka had no other option but to accept Indian assistance on India's terms. The price India extracted from the Sri Lankan government included: (1) Sri Lanka would not allow the expansion of Voice of America broadcasting facilities in Sri Lanka, and (2) Sri Lanka would not allow foreign naval vessels to dock in Tricomalee harbor in a manner prejudicial to India's interests (In other words Sri Lanka should not allow American naval vessels to dock in Tricomalee, the deep water harbor that is ideal for American ships).

Another "Indian doctrine" with respect to its weaker neighbors is in play today. Not only should countries in South Asia seek military assistance from India first when they have a need but they should also get India's approval for conducting peace talks to settle internal conflicts. Peace talks should be conducted in a manner that India approves and the final settlement should be acceptable to India.

This new doctrine is currently in play with respect to the Sri Lankan peace talks between the Sri Lankan government and the minority Tamil freedom fighters, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), to end the decades long bloody war that has taken over 60,000 lives in this tiny island. Everyone involved in the peace talks (the two principal parties and the well-meaning nations that directly or indirectly help shepherd the peace talks) are walking on eggshells and bending over backward to placate the Indian government.

Ever since the peace talks started under the facilitation of Norway and the tacit encouragement of United States of America (USA), European nations and Japan, not a week passes without the Sri Lankan President, Prime Minister or a senior official visits the Indian capital New Delhi to get India's blessing. Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe who seems to be interested in a peaceful resolution to the conflict and his ministers visit New Delhi ever so often and then give one-sided press conferences that India totally supports the ongoing peace talks. Sri Lankan President Chandrika

Kumaratunga who seems to want to scuttle the peace talks one way or other and her advisors visit New Delhi with almost equal frequency and then give one-sided press conferences that India is not pleased with some aspects of the talks and that the Sri Lankan Prime Minister should mind Indian concerns and reconsider some of his policies with respect to the talks. Either both the Prime Minister and the President are giving distorted picture of Indian views or India is talking through both sides of its mouth separately to the Prime Minister and the President. India is tight lipped about all this and issues occasional terse two-line statements of its support for a peaceful resolution.

The LTTE also issues occasional statements that India supports the peace talks and that LTTE is happy about it. These statements seem to be rehashed second hand information of what the Sri Lankan Prime Minister says, because India would not meet with LTTE representatives.

Norwegian facilitators do their best to keep the peace talks on track. They have nursed these talks to a stage far beyond all previous talks. India was not happy with Norwegian involvement from the very beginning. Only international opinion prevented India from vetoing Norwegian facilitation. Sri Lankan government would not act against Indian dictates.

In January of 2003, when Japan showed an interest to "supplement the efforts of Norway to help accelerate the peace process", Indian government reacted negatively. It told Japanese Foreign Minister and envoy in no uncertain terms that India would like Japan to restrict its role in Sri Lanka to financial aid and nothing more.

Involvement of countries like Norway and Japan who have no vested interest in Sri Lanka is good for the peace process. **India can never be a honest broker in Sri Lanka** because of its agenda in its tiny neighbour Sri Lanka. Remember how it extracted "concessions" from Sri Lanka in 1987 when it meddled in Sri Lankan affairs [Chapter 5; See, especially, Section 5]. Peace has a chance only if the two parties (Sinhalese and Tamils) reach a fair agreement that addresses the genuine grievances of the Tamil minority. A settlement cannot be imposed (as India tried to do in 1987); neither can a Sri Lankan military victory that decimates LTTE will lead to peace. A disgruntled Tamil population will resist Sinhala oppression, even without the LTTE, although not with the success LTTE has achieved. All it would take is a few determined men and women to keep the island in turmoil. That, actually, is what India wants. A Sri Lanka that is fearful of an uprising amongst the Tamil minority and agree to be India's subservient neighbour lest India again arm and train Tamil militants (as it did in the early 1980s: See Chapter 5, especially Section 2). This time India would make sure to arm totally subservient militant groups that would act as India's attack dogs that can be called off or ordered to attack as the situation warrants.

Best hope for Sri Lanka is to reach a just peaceful resolution to the conflict. For this to happen, India should stop meddling in the peace process and countries like Norway and Japan should even more actively shepherd the peace process. **International community**

should tell India privately, but firmly, that it would not tolerate India interfering in the peace process. Give peace a chance.

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12.
India is not an Acceptable Mediator for the Sri Lankan Conflict

Thanjai Nalankilli

[First Published: June 2000]

OUTLINE

Abbreviation
1. Two Brothers and a Cunning old Man
2. India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Minority

Abbreviation

LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

1. Two Brothers and a Cunning Old Man

Let me tell you a little story first.

There were two brothers in a village. They were constantly quarreling over a piece of land that their parents left them. Seeing this, an elderly man from the village came to them and said, "This quarrel of yours is going on for too long. I will settle this matter for you." The brothers said, "alright". This cunning old man went to the bigger brother and got a bribe secretly and promised to settle their dispute in his favor. That he did. The little brother refused to accept the old man's settlement. The quarrel between the brothers continued.

After a while another elderly man from a nearby village came to the brothers and said, "Brothers, let me arrange talks between the two of you. May be you can reach an amicable settlement". Hearing of this, the cunning old man who took a bribe from the big brother years ago came again and offered to mediate the dispute. Do you thing this elderly man should be accepted as the mediator? Do you think this man should be allowed any part in the talks? Don't you think that this man should be disqualified as a mediator or arbitrator because of his past corrupt action of taking a bribe?

2. India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Minority

What is happening between the Sri Lankan government (the Sinhalese majority), its Tamil minority and India parallel the little story told in Section 1. Sri Lankan government (the Sinhalese majority) is the big brother, Tamil minority is the little brother, India is the cunning elderly man of the village, and Norway is the elderly man from the nearby village.

There was (and is) a dispute - an armed conflict - between the Sri Lankan government (Sinhalese majority) and the Tamil minority over how much power the minority Tamils may have in their traditional Tamil homeland. India, as the big neighbor, said that it would settle the dispute and implemented a settlement in 1987. The dominant Tamil militant group, the LTTE, refused to accept it as inequitable to the Tamil minority.

Then a newspaper revealed two secret letters signed by the Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka on the same day they signed the settlement agreement (July 29, 1987). While the settlement agreement (The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord) was made public to the entire world, the letters were kept secret from even the leaders of minority Tamils who were affected by the settlement. The Tamil minority, even those Tamil groups that accepted the settlement, was not told of the secret letters.

The secret letters between India and Sri Lanka behind the back of the Tamil minority were revealing. Here is the relevant extract from one of the secret letters (from the Prime Minister of India to the President of Sri Lanka):

You had, during the course of our discussion, agreed to meet some of **India's concerns** as follows:

1) Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understanding about the relevance and employment of **foreign military and intelligence personnel** with a view to ensuring that such presence will not prejudice Indo-Sri Lanka relations.

2) **Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka** will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests.

3) The work of restoring and operating the **Trincomalee oil tank** will be undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka.

4) Sri Lanka's agreement with **foreign broadcasting organizations** will be reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or intelligence purposes.

These points have absolutely nothing to do with the conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil minority. These are military and economic concessions to India. In exchange for enforcing a settlement that is favorable to the Sri Lankan government (Sinhalese majority), the Sri Lankan government agrees not to allow military ships of countries "unfriendly" to India in its ports and agrees not to allow intelligence listening posts that may spy on India. Sri Lanka was also forced to take India as a joint venture partner in the lucrative Trincomalee Oil Tank Project, instead of getting the best business deal in open international bidding. These three points (2 military, 1 economic) are nothing but bribes; that is why the letters were kept secret.

What is the purpose of a bribe? If one party to a dispute bribes the judge, mediator or arbitrator, do you think the judge will settle the dispute justly, or unjustly in favor of the

one who bribed him/her? India asked for and took the bribe from the Sri Lankan government secretly behind the back of the minority Tamils and settled the matter in favor of the Sri Lankan government.

Those in Indian politics and Indian media who praise the settlement imposed by India in 1987 as a just solution for the Tamil minority never mention the bribe taken by India. How can the settlement be anything but tilted in favor of the bribe-giver, the Sri Lankan government?

Let us leave the past aside. Today, in May 2000, India has again offered to mediate between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil minority (specifically the LTTE). Sri Lankan Government immediately welcomed the offer although both Sri Lanka and LTTE agreed only a few months ago that Norway will act as the facilitator (or mediator), and Norway is in fact putting the groundwork for peace talks. Who knows what secret deals and bribes India demanded and got from Sri Lanka this time? We can never trust India to be a honest mediator. No one will allow a corrupt judge to mediate or arbitrate a dispute. So India should be disqualified to take part in any manner in peace talks between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE; neither as the sole mediator nor as a co-mediator with Norway. India should be kept out of any peace talks. World governments should ask India to stay aside and not to put a monkey wrench in a possible peace talk with Norway as facilitator or mediator.

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13.
India, Pakistan and the Sri Lankan Ethnic Conflict

Thanjai Nalankilli

[First Published: June 2006]

OUTLINE

Abbreviations
1. Sri Lanka to Buy Weapons from Pakistan
2. Sri Lanka does Nothing without Indian Permission
3. Why India does not Object to Pakistani Weapons to Sri Lanka?
4. What Happened in 2000?

Abbreviations

ACSA - Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement
BJP - Bharatiya Janata Party
LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MBRL - Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher
OPV - Offshore patrol vessel
USA - United States of America

1. Sri Lanka to Buy Weapons from Pakistan

There is a war going on between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) fighting to protect the interests of the discriminated Tamil minority. At the time of this writing (May 2006), there is a ceasefire between the warring parties but both sides seem to be preparing for the next round of battles.

Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa visited Pakistan in March-April 2006. He took with him a 80-member delegation that included military officials. There were press reports both in India and Sri Lanka that Sri Lanka was seeking multi-barrel rocket launchers (MBRLs) and other "advanced" weapons from Pakistan. There were also a few reports in the Indian press that India was angry at Sri Lanka seeking military assistance from its archenemy. Some predicted that India might now make a U-turn and start assisting the LTTE. Some Sri Lankan Tamil publications as well as some Tamil leaders expressed the hope that now India would support the Tamil minority.

This writer, who is from Tamilnadu, is of the opinion that there is no merit to the suggestions that India was angered by Sri Lanka buying weapons from Pakistan or that India would help LTTE out of that anger. **This writer is one hundred percent certain that the Sri Lankan government sought weapons from Pakistan only after receiving India's permission.**

2. Sri Lanka does Nothing without Indian Permission

From, at the latest, the mid 1990s, Sri Lankan government does not do anything relating to the ethnic conflict without first getting a green signal from India. Sri Lankan government is so afraid that India might again arm, train and shelter Tamil fighters (as it did between 1983 and 1987), that it gets Indian government permission before making any move relating to the ethnic conflict. Sri Lankan President, Prime Minister and cabinet ministers visit Indian capital New Delhi so often that they are visiting New Delhi more often than the Indian state chief ministers and ministers. During the negotiations that led to the 2002 ceasefire agreement, top Sri Lankan officials including the president visited New Delhi and, according to news reports, took into consideration certain Indian objections about the originally proposed composition of the international ceasefire-monitoring mission. Once the ceasefire agreement was signed and peace talks started, Sri Lankan ministers and/or Norwegian diplomats facilitating the talks visited New Delhi after every talk to appraise India of the situation.

Sri Lankan government negotiated the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with United States of America (USA) in 2002. In exchange for Sri Lanka allowing USA to utilize Sri Lanka's ports, airports and airspace for transit, servicing and repair, Sri Lanka would get additional military training and equipment from America. Sri Lankan newspapers reported that the agreement would be signed during Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's visit to America in July 2002. Sri Lanka might have thought that India may not object to a rather low-level agreement with the sole super power, especially in view of the closer relationship developing between India and America. But India conveyed to Sri Lanka its displeasure over the agreement and the agreement was never signed. India does not want American military vessels or aircraft passing through its southern neighbor (even though America issued a statement that it has no intention of establishing military bases in Sri Lanka).

It is inconceivable that Sri Lanka would buy weapons from India's life-long enemy Pakistan without India's approval.

3. Why India does not Object to Pakistani Weapons to Sri Lanka?

Why would India agree to its southern neighbor getting military assistance from its lifelong enemy Pakistan? **Indian rulers are dead-set against Sri Lankan Tamil minority getting meaningful autonomy or devolution or independence** [Chapters 1, 10]. It would do everything and anything to prevent it.

Then why not supply Sri Lanka the weapons it is seeking instead of allowing it to get them from Pakistan? The answer lies in India's internal political equations. For over a decade, Indian government is formed by a coalition of parties; no single party is able to get a parliamentary majority to form the government on its own. So the Hindi-belt centered national parties (such as the Congress Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)) had to ally with regional Tamil Nadu parties to form a coalition government. If India were to sell weapons like MBRLs and these weapons were to cause large-scale

Tamil civilian casualties in Sri Lanka, Tamil public in Tamil Nadu could react negatively and major street demonstrations could take place. Then the regional Tamil Nadu parties would have no alternative but to withdraw support to the coalition government. That is the reason for Indian government hesitation to supply MBRLs to Sri Lanka and rather allow Sri Lanka to get them from Pakistan.

4. What Happened in 2000?

It is not the first time that Sri Lanka purchased MBRLs from Pakistan without any negative reaction from India. That was in Year 2000. An LTTE offensive code-named Operation Oyatha Alaikal (Operation Ceaseless Waves) overran Sri Lankan military positions one after another in the north, captured the Elephant Pass Base and entered Jaffna. Fearing that LTTE would rout the tens of thousands of Sri Lankan troops stationed in Jaffna, Sri Lanka sought MBRLs from Pakistan and obtained them. According to **Jane's Intelligence Digest**, published in Britain, weapons and ammunition, including artillery shells and multi-barrel rocket launchers, were airlifted in an emergency operation from Karachi to Colombo in May with New Delhi's cooperation. (Karachi is a major city in Pakistan, Colombo is the capital of Sri Lanka, and New Delhi is the capital of India.) This more than proves that when things go bad for the Sri Lankan military, India would do whatever that needs to be done to thwart a major Tamil military victory, even cooperating with Pakistan with which it is in a perpetual state of war from the day they both received independence from British rule in 1947.

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14.
Why India, Pakistan, China and America are all Arming the Sri Lankan Military Against Minority Tamils?

Thanjai Nalankilli

[First Published: January 2008]

[This article is also included in the free e-books "United States of America and the Battle for Tamil Eelam" and "International Community and the Battle for Tamil Eelam" because of its relevance there also.]

OUTLINE

Abbreviations
1. Introduction
2. Myth of an Umbilical Relationship Between Sri Lankan Tamils and India
3. Sri Lankan Tamils Look to India
4. Why no one is Helping the Tamil Minority?

Abbreviations

ACSA - Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement
LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
USA - United States of America

1. Introduction

India, Pakistan, China and America are all helping the Sri Lankan military against the minority Tamil rebels, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It is unusual and, in fact, unnatural for all these countries to arm the same side in a civil war.

India and Pakistan are archenemies from the very day of their births on August 15, 1947. They have fought three major wars and there are ongoing border skirmishes. India is also accusing Pakistan of helping Kashmiri fighters and assisting in terrorist bomb attacks in India. It is thus natural for these two countries to help opposing sides in a war in their neighbourhood. Yet both are arming and training the Sri Lankan military in this war.

India and China may not be enemies but they surely are rivals for influence in the Indian Ocean region. In normal circumstances they would be supporting opposing sides in the Sri Lankan war. Yet both are providing weapons to Sri Lankan military; India is mostly giving them as gift and China is mostly selling them (like Pakistan).

India and United States of America (USA) are not enemies either. But they both have strategic interests in the Indian Ocean and Sri Lanka. In spite of its professed friendship with America, India jealously "guards" Sri Lanka from American influence. It was

reported in South Asian newspapers that it was India's disapproval that held up signing of the "Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA)" between Sri Lanka and USA for over four years (July 2002 - March 2007). In a separate incident, in late 2007, India was reportedly unhappy over Sri Lanka allowing America to install a RADAR system to monitor LTTE movements; India fears that America would also use the RADAR to spy on its military moves in southern India.

In spite of their enmity or rivalry with India, these countries--Pakistan, China and United States of America--support and assist the same side as India in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. Why? These countries think that even if they help the Tamil minority, once successful, the Tamils would "dump them" and side with India because of the umbilical relationship they "supposedly" have with India. What make them think so?

2. Myth of an Umbilical Relationship Between Sri Lankan Tamils and India

The umbilical relationship that Sri Lankan Tamils have is with the Tamil Nadu Tamils, and not with India as such. Let me elaborate.

There are about 60 million Tamils in the Indian Union, primarily in the southern state of Tamil Nadu. They are of the same ethnic origin, speak the same language and have the same culture as Sri Lankan Tamils. Tamils are less than 10% of the Indian population. The rest of India speaks a dozen or so major languages. The largest group is the Hindi speakers of north India. They constitute about 40% of the population. Although they do not have a majority in the Indian parliament, Hindi politicians dominate Indian government policy making by allying with willing, and often power-hungry, politicians from other regions [See Reference 1 for details].

Political parties from Tamilnadu have been allying with Hindi-dominated political parties and sharing power at the Indian central government for almost two decades. Yet when it comes to Sri Lanka, decisions are made by Hindi politicians even if they go against the sentiments of their allies in Tamilnadu. Power hungry Tamil politicians look the other way even as the Indian Government carries out decidedly anti-Tamil policies in the Sri Lankan ethnic war. Any expression of disagreement with Indian policies on Sri Lanka would result in "anti-Indian" and "anti-national" labels, and possible removal from ministerial positions at the central government and dismissal of the state government (even if the party came to power with a overwhelming majority in Tamil Nadu).

In short, although there is a blood bond, an umbilical relationship between Sri Lankan Tamils and Tamil Nadu Tamils, that bond--that special relationship--does not extend to the north or to the Indian government. To think that the Indian government has a special relationship, a kin feeling with Sri Lankan Tamils, and would come to their aide is wrong thinking. Events of the past two decades are evidence enough. It has nothing to do with the 1991 assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by a Sri Lankan Tamil lady. India's anti-Tamil actions in Sri Lanka pre-date the assassination [Chapter 8, 6].

3. Sri Lankan Tamils Look to India

The unfortunate fact is that many Sri Lankan Tamils including many of their leaders of all political hue and colour seem to think that one day their knight in shining armour would come riding from New Delhi and save them. They think that their only possible help is from India and do not look for help elsewhere. In spite of India's help to the Sri Lankan government militarily, financially and diplomatically, many Sri Lankan Tamil people and leaders swear their eternal allegiance and love for India. They hope against hope that, may be, may be, their oft-repeated statements of love and loyalty might bring some help from India. That is not to be. India continues to provide military, financial and diplomatic assistance to Sri Lanka in its war against the Tamil minority. This writer is of the opinion that India would never help Sri Lankan Tamils achieve their legitimate rights. India's actions during the past two and a half decades are indicative of this.

4. Why no one is Helping the Tamil Minority?

Tamil leaders' **oft-repeated recitals of love and loyalty to India** are not only heard in the Indian capital New Delhi, they are also heard in the capitals of Pakistan, China and America. Policy makers in those capitals reach the logical conclusion that even if they were to help the Tamils now, if they were to achieve their legitimate rights because of that help, they would go back to India once their problems are solved. So they shy away from offering any help to the Tamil minority. Instead they compete to provide military assistance to the Sri Lankan government, hoping to have at least some influence in Sri Lanka.

Reference

1. Who Rules India?, "Hindi Imposition Papers: Volume 1 (Chapter 10)," edited by Thanjai Nalankilli, Free e-book available where you downloaded this book.

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15.
Sri Lanka, America and India: Two Suitors for a Lady

Thanjai Nalankilli

[First Published: December 2002; Updated December 2007]

[This article is also included in our book "America and the Battle for Tamil Eelam" because of its relevance there also.]

OUTLINE

1. A Little Story
2. Sri Lanka Flirts with America and India

1. A Little Story

There was this young woman of loose moral character in a small township. Most everyone in the township knew everybody. She loved no one but herself. She was reasonably beautiful. That and her loose moral character attracted young men to her. So there were a few suitors for her.

She enjoyed receiving expensive gifts from her suitors. There were especially two suitors of considerable means. She played one against the other to get expensive gifts from both. She would tell one, "Oh, he gave me this bracelet. What had you given me lately? I think I will become his steady girlfriend." So he gives her an expensive diamond necklace. Then she goes to the other, shows him the necklace and says that she may decide to become the other man's steady girlfriend. So he rushes and buys her another expensive gift. This went on for a little while. Soon both her suitors understood what was going on and stopped seeing her. No more gifts. No more pampering. She died alone a spinster.

2. Sri Lanka Flirts with America and India

Sri Lankan Government's recent diplomatic actions remind us of this young woman of loose moral character. Sri Lankan Government is playing neighboring India against the United States of America (USA). India is a regional South Asian power, with even greater ambitions. United States of America is the sole superpower of the world with its own strategic and economic interests in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The old "rivalry" between India and the United States of the cold war era is past. Everything may look "buddy-buddy" between India and America outside. But both are highly suspicious of each other, especially India. India has greater ambitions for the future and does not want the "big boy" America around. United States is not totally trusting of India either; they definitely should not.

In is in the background of this geopolitical dance between America and India is Sri Lanka playing its dubious game of pitching one suitor against the other. India does not want

United States of America getting a foothold in Sri Lanka. In fact, an exchange of letters between Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayawardene and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1987 stipulated that "Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests" (a definite reference to America during those cold war days when India was an "unofficial ally", or at least a good friend, to the then Soviet Union).

Indian Government considers that those letters and the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord to which the letters were annexed are still in effect. By the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the then Sri Lankan President Premadasa considered the accord null and void for all practical purposes and asked Indian troops to leave the island. But the present Sri Lankan Government keeps a fuzzy view about it. Sri Lanka seems to interpret that the provisions of the letters about "ports for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests" do not apply to United States of America any more under the present post cold war circumstances of "friendship" between India and America. Indian Government, however, does not seem to hold that view. It seems to hold the view that transit facilities or bases for American military can be offered only if SriLanka gets India's prior "approval". A case in point.

In May 2002, the Sri Lankan Government negotiated an "Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA)" with the United States. This agreement would allow United States military to utilize Sri Lanka's ports, airports and air space. It was widely anticipated that the agreement would be signed during Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's visit to America in July 2002. It did not happen. Why? India quietly let it be known to Sri Lanka of its "displeasure" about the agreement. India did not want any American or other western military presence, even a transit arrangement, in Sri Lanka. At the time of this writing the agreement was yet to be signed. Sri Lanka plans to have the cake and eat it. It would provide its facilities open to the United States but without a formal agreement.

Red lights should be blinking in Washington at the US State Department and the Defense Department. Will the United States be able to avail itself of Sri Lankan facilities at a time of need (for example, an urgent military operation in the Middle East or Central Asia) if India quietly conveys its objection to Sri Lanka? With or without a signature on a piece of paper, can the United States of America put its eggs in the Sri Lankan basket?

Even at the best of times Sri Lanka is not trustworthy. Anyone dealing with it should be aware of its duplicity and double-dealings. I remember reading the following incidence in the newspapers. United Nations imposed an economic embargo on Iraq in 1990 (this was just before the **1991 Gulf War**). United States Navy was at the forefront of enforcing the naval blockade. One day a suspicious ship going towards Iraq was located. American naval vessels rushed to that ship. It was a Sri Lankan ship going to Iraq, surreptitiously breaking the United Nations embargo. Soon the Gulf War broke out. Once the war broke out it was evident that the United States led coalition was committed to liberating Kuwait. Now Sri Lanka switched sides and offered to help America by allowing United States Air Force to refuel in Sri Lanka.

War clouds are gathering over Iraq again. On October 11, 2002 Sri Lankan Prime Minister told that Sri Lanka would not provide America any transit facilities if war broke out between Iraq and a coalition led by America, because there was no defense pact between the two countries. But, somehow, according to Sri Lankan logic, it is all right for Sri Lanka to seek weapons and training from the United States although there was no defense pact.

What America needs in South Asia is not a wavering, opportunistic friend but a solid and capable ally that would stand by it whether it rains or shines.

UPDATE (December 2007)

Sri Lanka and United States of America (USA) signed the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) on March 5, 2007 almost five years after it was tentatively agreed in 2002. The ACSA would be valid for 10 years. Whether India finally gave its nod for the agreement after almost five years or if Sri Lanka did it without seeking India's approval is not known.

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16.
India Sheds Crocodile Tears for Palestinians but Shows No Concern for Sri Lankan Tamils

Thanjai Nalankilli

[First Published: July 2008; Updated March 2009]

Abbreviations

LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
UN - United Nations

On February 11, 2008, India condemned Israel for using force against Palestinians in Gaza. It said that the misery and hardship faced by Palestinians in Gaza is deplorable. It further added that it would provide relief supplies to Gaza civilians blockaded and denied basic amenities.

Closer to home, Tamil civilians in northeastern Sri Lanka are suffering untold hardships because of the use of force by Sri Lankan Government (in spite of LTTE's willingness for ceasefire and talks). While almost all democracies have criticized the gross human rights violations perpetrated by Sri Lankan military, para-military and police against minority Tamils, India is yet to condemn Sri Lanka as it did with Israel. Tamil people in northern Sri Lanka suffer from malnutrition and lack of medical supplies as reported repeatedly by independent relief agencies. Yet India has not sent an ounce food or medicine to them. Since the Indian government was not doing anything, people from Tamilnadu donated monies and purchased food and medicine to send to fellow Tamils in northern Sri Lanka through the Red Cross. India refuses to give permission to Red Cross to take the food and medicine to Sri Lanka; it is well over a year since the request for permission was made. India was going to send relief supplies to Gaza thousands of miles away but refuses permission for Red Cross to send food and medicine to Sri Lankan Tamils just a few miles away. Do the sufferings of Tamil people amuse Indian rulers?

In December 2008, the principal partner of the Indian ruling coalition, the Congress Party, condemned Israeli attacks on Gaza strip. It said, "The disproportionate use of brute force by Israel, resulting in colossal loss of civilian lives, including women and children, has caused deep shock and anguish throughout the world. This action, therefore, deserves strongest condemnation." Congress called for the United Nations (UN) and all countries to intervene for an immediate ceasefire and resumption of dialogue. (This statement was made in the context of the fighting between Israeli army and Palestinian fighters, the Hamas, stationed in Gaza.)

At the very same moment fighting was raging in neighboring Sri Lanka between the Sri Lankan army and the Tamil freedom fighters, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Congress Party made vague statements like we are concerned about Tamil civilians but never made a strong statement such as the one it had made in the previous

paragraph about the Gaza fighting. There was no condemnation of Sri Lankan military action that was killing hundreds of civilians. Also it never asked the Indian government to bring the matter before the United Nations. Instead the India was providing training to Sri Lankan Air Force that was bombing and creating heavy casualties among Tamil civilians.

It is also interesting that the Congress Party called for dialogue between Israel and Hamas. India's position on Sri Lanka was that LTTE should lay down arms; no such requirement was made on Hamas.

NOTE: This article is not about who is right or wrong in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Purpose of this article is to contrast India's actions in that conflict and in the conflict between Sri Lankan government and minority Tamils.

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17.
India's Promise of "Humanitarian Aid" to Sri Lankan Military has already Helped the Sri Lankan Military and Harmed Tamil Civilians (Year 2000)

Yashoda Reddy & Siva Reddy

[First Published: June 2000]

Abbreviation
LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

This note is not about the absurd notion of "humanitarian aid" to an army in the middle of a battle. Whether it is sending medicine and food to an encircled army or evacuating it is military aid by any norm. That is not the subject of this note. We are of the opinion that India's very promise of evacuation, when requested, has already helped the Sri Lankan army in the ongoing war and, what is more, harmed Tamil civilians in the battle zone, Jaffna. "Humanitarian aid to an army during war" is nothing but "military aid".

How has India's promise helped the Sri Lankan military already?

Any army almost encircled by enemy troops would withdraw to safety if it determines that any further delay might mean annihilation in the hands of the enemy. This is especially true if a sizable chunk of the army is thus trapped and face annihilation or surrender in the middle of a war. Sri Lanka has more than one-quarter of its army almost encircled by LTTE in Jaffna. It is now clear that Sri Lanka cannot evacuate these forces in a hurry because it lacks sufficient ships and planes; also, its escape route may be cut-off any day by the enemy. So the Sri Lankan army would have evacuated Jaffna by now (as it did at the Elephant Pass) had it not been for India's promise of evacuation. Not only did India make the promise, it has also assembled a naval armada and supporting Air Force planes just miles from Jaffna. Thus the Sri Lankan army could be evacuated within hours notice unless LTTE attempts to block the evacuation and take on the Indian army. In other words, the Sri Lankan army could fight to the last hour until the situation is very desperate, knowing that it would be evacuated and there is no danger of annihilation or surrender. This allows field commanders to make risky battlefield decisions they may not otherwise consider, improves troop morale and allows time to get more weapons to continue the fight. Thus the Sri Lankan military has already been helped greatly by India's promise. [It is our opinion that the Sri Lankan army would have withdrawn from Jaffna by now (third week of May 2000); no military would risk losing more than one-quarter of its army in the middle of a war.]

How are the Tamil civilians harmed by India's promise?

Had it not been for India's promise of evacuation, the Sri Lankan army would have withdrawn from Jaffna and the battle would have ended by mid-May (year 2000), at the least. All the Tamil civilian casualties after that time (well over a hundred deaths and

many more injuries) and thousands of Tamil refugees would not have occurred but for the Indian promise. It is in fact an irony that India's promise of so-called "humanitarian aid" to Sri Lankan soldiers in the battlefield should cause a humanitarian disaster for innocent civilians.

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18.
India Sends Medical Aid to Sri Lankan Soldiers at War
(even as Tamil civilians go without medicine)

Thanjai Nalankilli

[First Published: June 2009]

OUTLINE

1. Injured Tamil Civilians Suffer without Drugs
2. India Sends Medicine to Sri Lankan Soldiers Surreptitiously,
3. Are Indian Rulers Deaf to Tamil Sufferings?

1. Injured Tamil Civilians Suffer without Drugs

War is raging in Sri Lanka between the army and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the minority Tamil fighters. Thousands of minority Tamil civilians are killed and many more injured in Sri Lankan army shelling and Sri Lankan Air Force bombings. Sri Lankan government severely limits medicine and medical personnel going to treat injured civilian in hospitals near the war zone. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is the only relief agency allowed to help the civilians in war zone; all other agencies are prohibited from the area. There is shortage of drugs, bandages, gauze, anesthetics, blood bags and other medical supplies needed to treat the injured. Doctors tear up bed sheets to bind the wounds and use palm sticks to support fractures. Injured civilians lie in the open under tarpaulins with drips suspended from tree branches. Surgeries are conducted without anesthetics; amputations are performed without anesthetics. Such is the dire situation of Tamil civilians injured in the war. (All this information could be verified from website of international humanitarian agencies and western media.)

2. India Sends Medicine to Sri Lankan Soldiers Surreptitiously

Sixty million Tamils live in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. They are of the same ethnicity of Sri Lankan Tamils who are going through such sufferings in the ethnic war. People of Tamilnadu contributed over 50 crore Rupees (500 million Rupees) to buy and send food, medicine and other essential supplies to war-affected Tamil civilians in Sri Lanka. As of this writing, much of the money is still sitting in Indian banks awaiting permission from the Indian and Sri Lankan governments. Some food, utensils and clothes were purchased and sent from the 50 crore Rupees but published list of items do not include drugs or medical supplies. Tamil Nadu would need Indian and Sri Lankan government permission to send food or drugs.

All of a sudden, around February 4, 2009, Indian government announced that it was sending 85 lakh Rupees (8.5 million Rupees) worth of medicine to Sri Lankan government. Why was India sending this 8.5 million Rupees worth of medicine from its

own funds while some 250 to 300 million Rupees from Tamil Nadu was still sitting in bank accounts? There is a reason. Tamilnadu insisted that its funds should go to Tamil civilians through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or other established humanitarian groups and should not be handed over to the Sri Lankan government. On the contrary India handed over the 85 million Rupees of drugs to the Sri Lankan government. Would the Sri Lankan government use some or all of the drugs to treat wounded soldiers or innocent civilians shelled and bombed by Sri Lankan military? There is no openness. There is no transparency in where the drugs would go.

Answer as to where the Indian drugs go came unexpectedly from the Sri Lankan government around February 19, 2009. Questioned by members of parliament about injured soldiers suffering because of shortage of post-surgery pain killer drug peathadine, Sri Lankan Health Minister Nimal Siripala De Silva replied that the government had difficulty getting the drug from western countries but the Indian government would provide this much needed medicine. India kept its supply of drugs to Sri Lankan army a secret; it only announced that it was sending medicine to Tamil civilians. We do not know the extent of medical supplies India was giving the Sri Lankan army even as injured Tamil civilians go through untold sufferings due to medical shortage. India's dealings with Sri Lanka are shrouded in secrecy, hidden even from central government cabinet ministers from Tamilnadu. (This is what Tamil Nadu chief minister and president of the Tamil Nadu political party Dravida Munnertra Kazhagam (DMK) said on January 30, 2009; his party has several cabinet ministers in the central government and he said that these ministers are not privy to India's assistance to Sri Lankan military.)

3. Are Indian Rulers Deaf to Tamil Sufferings?

This writer is not opposed to India providing the powerful pain killer peathadine to Sinhala soldiers in post-surgery pain. Many of the soldiers in the Sri Lankan army, as opposed to senior officers, come from poor Sinhala families; they enroll in the army because there is no other employment. We understand their pain. We have as much sympathy for them as for the injured Tamil civilians. We would not complain if at least half of the much needed pain killer drug peathadine went to Tamil civilians (there is no record of civilian hospitals near war zone getting peathadine). Instead all of it went to Sri Lankan soldiers. Tamil civilians including children have their legs or arms amputated without anesthetics or painkillers, yet the Indian government looks the other way and sends painkillers to Sri Lankan soldiers. In the eyes of Indian rulers who are from the Hindi-belt (north India), are Sri Lankan Tamils who are blood relations to Tamils of South India sub-humans, compared to Sinhala soldiers whose ancestors supposedly migrated from North India? [Read Reference 1 to understand that Hindi-belt politicians are the rulers of all of India.]

This kind of callous attitude towards Tamils pervades Indian government actions. When scores of Tamils were murdered and raped during the 1991 riots in the Indian state of Karnataka, Indian government refused to send army or central paramilitary forces to stop it. Yet when a few people from the Hindi state of Uttar Pradesh were killed by nearby Sikh rebels in the 1990s, Indian army was rushed there. See the difference.

Fishermen from the Indian state of Tamil Nadu were being shot and killed by Sri Lankan navy, and India would not even launch a formal diplomatic protest. After so much pressure from Tamil Nadu, and after well over a decade of killings totaling scores of Tamil Nadu fishermen [Reference 2], India called the Sri Lankan diplomat in New Delhi to the External Affairs Ministry and registered a formal protest. In contrast, within days after the killing of a single northern fisherman by Pakistani Navy, Pakistani diplomat was called to the external affairs ministry and a formal protest was registered. Compare and contrast. India protests only after scores of killings and over a few dozen calls and letters from Tamil Nadu State chief ministers. One killing in the north, diplomatic protest within days. Are Indian rulers deaf to Tamil sufferings? Are Tamil people second-rate citizens within the Indian Union?

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19.
When Sri Lanka is Pricked, Indian Navy Jumps

Thanjai Nalankilli

[First Published: January 2008]

Sri Lanka is a tiny island south of the giant India with over 50 times the population of Sri Lanka. There is an ethnic war going on between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil minority. Whenever Sri Lankan armed forces are pricked in that civil war, Indian Navy jumps to attention. Why?

In October 2007, Tamil rebels, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), carried out a daring and successful attack at a Sri Lankan Air Force Base in Anuradhapura, deep in Sinhala territory. Immediately Indian Navy went on alert as if LTTE's next target would be India. There is no reason for the Indian government to think that way because there had never been a military attack on Indian soil in this two decade long war, and there is no conceivable reason for LTTE to attack India now and invite a sure, swift and severe retaliation.

We can understand Sri Lanka putting its navy on alert in case the Anuradhapura attack was the first of a series of LTTE strikes against its military. But why India? Did India put its navy on alert to give the Sri Lankan Navy a helping hand in case LTTE continues with its attacks and gets an upper hand in the war?

In November 2007, Sri Lankan Air Force bombed a bunker and killed LTTE's Political Division Head Suppiah Paramu Tamilselvan (S. P. Tamilselvan). Again, Indian Navy was put on the alert. Why? We can understand Sri Lankan Navy going on alert expecting possible retaliatory strikes by LTTE Naval Wing (Sea Tigers). Why did India put its navy on alert? Was it to help the Sri Lankan Navy in case LTTE got an upper hand in the sea battles?

Indian Navy had, in the past, come to assist the Sri Lankan Navy when it needed help. In May 2007 LTTE ships were about to attack a Sri Lankan ship carrying 700 Sri Lankan soldiers to the north. All of a sudden Indian Navy ships came to the area. According to a report published by D. B. S. Jeyaraj, no friend of LTTE, "Indian ships stood guard". LTTE backed off from the attack. India based **NDTV** website said, in a report titled Indian navy ships 'save' Lanka troops, "Indian military ships in the Palk Strait discouraged Tamil rebel attacks that could have killed at least 700 Sri Lankan soldiers".

What is the purpose of the Indian naval armada stationed on Tamil Nadu coast? Is it to protect Indian citizens in the south or is it a contracted mercenary navy to help Sri Lanka?

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